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iQUESTION PRESENTED
Does the communications Decency Act, 47 u.S.c. 
§ 230’s prohibition on treating providers of interactive 
computer services as publishers or speakers of third-
party information posted on their sites, bar states from 
imposing civil liability on website owners or operators 
for their own design, content and conduct intended to 
facilitate and profit from tortious or criminal activity (as 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the First Circuit, and other 
courts have held), or does it bar only those claims that 
seek to impose liability on website owners or operators for 
third-party posts (like the Washington Supreme Court, 
and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held)?
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING  
AND RELATED CASES
Petitioner Yasmeen Daniel, Individually, and as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Zina Daniel 
Haughton, was the Plaintiff in the trial court, Appellant 
in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the Respondent 
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut, as 
Subrogee for Jalisco’s LLC was an Intervening Plaintiff 
in the trial court. 
Armslist, LLC, Brian Mancini and Jonathan Gibbon 
were the Defendants in the trial court, Respondents in 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the Petitioners in 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
Devin Linn, Broc Elmore, ABC Insurance Co., DEF 
Insurance Co., and Special Administrator Jennifer Valenti 
on behalf of the Estate of Radcliffe Haughton were 
Defendants in the trial court. 
Progressive Universal Insurance Company was an 
Intervening Defendant in the trial court. 
Daniel v. Armslist, LLC et al., case No. 15-cv-8710, 
Wisconsin Circuit Court for Milwaukee County. Order 
entered November 28, 2016.
Daniel v. Armslist, LLC et al., Appeal No. 2017AP344, 
Court of Appeals of the State of Wisconsin. Decision filed 
April 19, 2018.
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1PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Yasmeen Daniel, Individually, and as 
Special Administrator of the Estate of Zina Daniel 
Haughton (collectively, “Petitioner” or “Yasmeen”), 
respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review 
a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 
this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is 
reported at 386 Wis.2d 449, 926 N.W.2d 710, and is 
included in the Appendix (“App.”) A at 1a–42a. The 
opinion of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is reported at 
382 Wis.2d 241, 913 N.W.2d 211, and included at App. B 
at 43a-69a. The Wisconsin Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County ruled on the motion to dismiss at issue here from 
the bench. See App. D at 73a-97a. 
JURISDICTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court entered judgment on 
April 30, 2019. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 u.S.c. § 1257.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant statute is the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, which appears in full 
at App. E at 98a-104a.
2STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On October 18, 2012, after years of threats and violent 
abuse, Zina Daniel Haughton (“Zina”) obtained a domestic 
abuse restraining order against her estranged husband, 
Radcliffe Haughton (“Haughton”). App. A at 3a, 32a. The 
order, issued by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court to 
protect Zina, prohibited Haughton from possessing a 
gun, and made him a “prohibited” firearms purchaser 
under federal and state criminal laws. Id; App. B at 47a, 
51a-52a. But Haughton knew how to easily circumvent the 
law and the order. He went on the Internet and visited 
Armslist.com. App. A at 4a. Armslist.com is an online gun 
marketplace specifically designed to facilitate the illegal 
purchase of firearms by people like Haughton, who the law 
forbids from buying guns. App. A at 4a-6a. As intended by 
Armslist.com’s negligent and intentional design features, 
Haughton found a person willing to sell him a gun, Devin 
Linn (“Linn”), and quickly and easily obtained a handgun 
and three high-capacity magazines in an all cash deal 
consummated in a McDonald’s parking lot three days 
after the restraining order was issued. App. A at 4a-6a. 
The next day, Haughton used the gun he purchased via 
Armslist.com to murder Zina and two of her coworkers 
and wound four others before killing himself. App. A at 
4a, 33a, 35a. Yasmeen Daniel is Zina’s daughter, who was 
present when Haughton murdered her mother and was 
traumatized by the carnage she witnessed. App. A at 4a.
3As alleged in the Complaint, Armslist1 entered the 
online gun business to cater to the criminal gun market 
when companies like eBay and Craigslist stopped allowing 
online firearms sales, after recognizing that they were 
inconsistent with their obligation to follow federal law. 
App. A at 4a-6a, 34a-36a, App. B at 48a-51a. Armslist 
intentionally designed its site to facilitate the breaking 
and circumvention of gun laws, laws intended to prevent 
tragedies like those that killed Yasmeen Daniel’s mother. 
Id. Intentionally creating a massive 24/7 online gun 
marketplace to supply and profit from gun sales to felons, 
domestic violence abusers, and others prohibited by federal 
law from buying or possessing guns, Armslist created 
and designed features, drafted its own terms posted 
on the site and engaged in other conduct specifically to 
attract prohibited persons and facilitate illegal sales and 
purchases. Id. Armslist did this by, inter alia, precluding 
the flagging of illegal sales (while allowing flagging for 
other reasons); allowing people to anonymously purchase 
guns without a background check; assuring users in 
its own posting that it would not check the legality of a 
sale; enabling prohibited purchasers to search only for 
sellers that did not check criminal backgrounds or keep 
records; and enabling sellers to identify themselves as 
“private sellers” (who do not check criminal records). Id. 
Armslist also affirmatively chose to design its site without 
features used by other sites that require users to register 
an account and to be transferred guns only by licensed 
dealers who submit purchasers to background checks. 
App. B at 50a-51a. Armslist’s design features, content it 
created, enabled illegal gun buyers to buy guns without 
detection, and to evade federal and state laws, including 
1.  Defendants Armslist, LLC, Jonathan Gibbon and Brian 
Mancini are referred to collectively herein as “Armslist.”
4those requiring background checks, waiting periods, and 
restricting interstate and assault weapons sales. App. A at 
4a-6a, 34a-36a; App. B at 47a-51a. Armslist is well aware 
that its website is a haven for illegal gun buyers and sellers 
that has resulted in death, but it has chosen to continue 
its anything-goes, guns-for-all (including criminals and 
domestic abusers) business model. Id.
B. Proceedings Below
Yasmeen commenced this personal injury and 
wrongful death case asserting eleven claims under 
Wisconsin tort law, including, inter alia, negligence, 
negligence per se – based on the violation of firearms laws 
– negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, 
aiding and abetting tortious conduct, public nuisance and 
wrongful death against Armslist. App. A at 6a. Yasmeen 
sought to impose liability on the owners and operators 
of Armslist.com for their own negligent and intentional 
creation of website features and content to facilitate illegal 
gun possession and sales, which foreseeably caused a 
person prohibited from buying guns to buy a gun and kill 
Yasmeen Daniel’s mother. App. A at 34a-36a; App. B at 
45a-52a, 60a-61a. Petitioner pointedly did not claim that 
Armslist should be liable for publishing Linn’s ad, or be 
treated as a publisher or speaker of information provided 
by a third party. App. A at 37a-38a; App. B at 60a-61a, 
63a. Indeed, Armslist could be liable even if, after creating 
its website, someone else had maintained or owned the 
website and published Linn’s ad.
Armslist moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
mostly contending that even if it could be liable under 
Wisconsin tort law, the Communications Decency Act, 47 
5U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”), barred Wisconsin courts from 
applying its tort law to grant Yasmeen a remedy.2 App. 
A at 36a. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court granted 
Armslist’s motion, holding that because Yasmeen’s claims 
were “based on the website design,” the CDA shielded 
Armslist, LLC and its owners Jonathan Gibbon and Brian 
Mancini from liability for their own conduct. App. D at 
84a-96a; App. C at 72a (Order). Yasmeen timely appealed 
to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed. App. B at 
45a-46a. The Court held that the claims against Armslist 
are not barred because the CDA only protects website 
operators from being treated as a publisher or speaker 
of another’s content, but does not prohibit liability for the 
website’s own design and content or conduct. Id. As the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained, “the allegations in 
the complaint, which are that Armslist used website design 
features to facilitate illegal firearms purchases, do not 
seek to hold Armslist liable on a theory prohibited by the 
Act.” App. B at 46a. The Court of Appeals held that “the 
Act does not protect a website operator from liability that 
arises from its own conduct in facilitating user activity, as 
is the case here.” Id. Using a plain language interpretation 
of the Act and applying federalism principles applicable to 
construing federal laws, the Court noted that “Armslist 
effectively ignores the Act’s phrase ‘publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another.’” App. B at 
45a-46a, 56a-59a, 61a-63a, 67a-68a. 
2.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not address whether 
Armslist could be held liable under Wisconsin state tort law 
irrespective of the CDA. App. A. The trial court ruled that 
Yasmeen did not state a negligence per se claim against Armslist 
under Wisconsin law, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed 
and Armslist did not appeal that decision. App. B 45a-46a; App. A. 
6Largely without addressing the rationale of the Court 
of Appeals, including not mentioning federalism principles, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, as a matter 
of law, the CDA barred Wisconsin courts from holding 
Armslist liable for its own conduct and website design 
and content it created, regardless of whether Armslist 
intended its website to facilitate illegal gun sales. App. A 
at 9a-31a. The Court held (1) Yasmeen’s claims “treated” 
Armslist as a “publisher” of third party content – that 
is, Linn’s ad – because the duty underlying the claims 
derived from Armslist’s “role as a publisher of firearm 
advertisements;” and (2) Armslist could not be deemed an 
“information content provider” because its design features 
were “neutral tools” that did not “materially contribute” 
to the illegality of Linn’s advertisement. Id. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The CDA is a critical statute that governs liability on 
the Internet, today’s hub of commerce and communications. 
By its language, Section 230 would appear to do nothing 
to restrict tort liability for creating dangerous website 
design or content. Yet, according to the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin, and several federal appeals courts, the CDA 
provides sweeping civil immunity. Under this reading 
of the CDA, a business (gunsforkillersandkids.com or 
illegaldrugs.com, say) that was intentionally created, 
designed and marketed to cause and profit from crime 
(from terrorism to drug trafficking to gun crimes) cannot 
be subjected to civil liability for its wrongful conduct so 
long as one of its acts was publication of a third-party post. 
But Congress never enacted, or intended, such 
immunity. The relevant CDA provision merely states 
that: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
7service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.” Id. The CDA was enacted to promote “decency” 
on the Internet, mostly by shielding website providers 
from liability when they take responsible measures to 
prevent access to offensive or detrimental material online. 
Nothing in the CDA shields bad actors from liability for 
bad acts other than publishing third party information, 
such as intentionally or negligently designing a website 
with the purpose of facilitating illegal gun sales or 
creating their own content intended to facilitate crimes. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and several federal 
appellate courts have read the CDA wholly at odds with its 
language and intent. According to these courts, the CDA 
bars states from subjecting internet providers to liability 
for their own conduct, website design and content, even if 
they intentionally circumvent laws and facilitate crimes 
that states have a strong interest in preventing. It thereby 
creates a haven, beyond the reach of state tort law, for 
websites that intentionally facilitate and profit from the 
most dangerous activities and commerce that take place 
in the dark reaches of the Internet. 
But other courts, like the Washington Supreme Court, 
the Seventh Circuit, and several other federal appellate 
courts read the CDA closer to its text, as providing far 
more limited protection, or no immunity at all. Thus, the 
CDA has been applied in wildly inconsistent ways by 
both state and federal courts, resulting in a patchwork of 
conflicting decisions and a minefield for Internet providers 
and victims of online misconduct who seek civil justice. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s overbroad reading of 
the CDA is yet another example of confusion regarding 
this statute. 
8The decision below is also the latest example of courts 
defying this Court’s federalist principles of the “clear 
statement rule” and the presumption against preemption. 
precedent such as Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 
(2014), Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 u.S. 452 (1991), and 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 u.S. 504 (1992), require 
that state authority be preserved absent a clear statement 
of Congressional intent to limit it. Because “the States 
are independent sovereigns in our federal system,” “[i]n 
all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which 
Congress has ‘legislated…in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied,’ [courts] ‘start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 u.S. 470, 484 (1996) (quoting Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). If 
those federalism principles are applied, as they must be 
and as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did, the CDA must 
be construed to allow state tort law liability for negligent 
conduct or website design or content creation, given the 
lack of a clear statement of Congressional intent to bar 
such liability.
Those core principles of federalism are absent from 
CDA analysis by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as well 
as several federal circuits. Even though the state court 
of appeals relied on these principles, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court eschewed them in holding that the CDA 
barred state tort liability for Armslist’s “own actions” 
in facilitating and encouraging illegal gun sales, even 
though the CDA does not state that such liability is barred. 
App. A at 7a, 24a, 38a, 41a; App. B at 51a, 58a-61a, 68a 
(emphasis added). It is no exaggeration to say that much 
of this Court’s federalism precedent appears to be a dead 
9letter in Wisconsin – and other courts as well. Accordingly, 
this case also presents an important opportunity to re-
establish that this Court’s federalism precedents provide 
a limiting principle for construction of federal laws that 
might infringe on state authority, including the CDA. 
Only review by this Court can ensure that federal statutes 
are construed in accord with the federalism principles 
articulated by this Court.
Review is also needed because, if the CDA is read to 
immunize website owners and operators from liability for 
their own acts in intentionally designing and operating 
websites with the purpose of facilitating illegal conduct, 
the dangerous implications for society at large cannot be 
overstated given the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, 
and its potential for mischief. 
I. A Uniform Construction Of The CDA In Accord 
With Its Text And Congressional Intent Presents 
An Important Issue Of National Concern In Today’s 
Internet-Driven Economy
According to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, from 1998 to 2017, E-commerce grew 
at an annual rate of over 4 times the growth in the overall 
economy and “accounted for 6.9 percent ($1,351.3 billion) of 
current-dollar gross domestic product” in 2017.3 Familiar 
businesses, such as Amazon.com and Walmart.com, derive 
enormous revenue from Internet sales. But others use the 
3.  Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Measuring the Digital Economy: An Update Incorporating Data 
from the 2018 Comprehensive Update of the Industry Economic 
Accounts (Apr. 2019), available at https://www.bea.gov/system/
files/2019-04/digital-economy-report-update-april-2019_1.pdf.
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Internet “to sell tainted, fake, and poor quality drugs to 
anyone with a credit card and the willingness to pay,”4 
and engage in all manner of nefarious activities, from 
facilitating terrorism to the illegal firearm sales at issue 
here. The growing importance and use of the Internet in 
commerce and communications requires that the web not 
become an anything-goes haven, exempt from traditional 
rules of liability and accountability. Those hurt by illegal 
sales through E-Commerce should not have lesser 
recourse to compensation than they would against a brick-
and-mortar store – and the CDA provides no warrant to 
create a difference. That some courts have established 
the CDA as a bar to a remedy presents an issue of great 
national importance that merits this Court’s attention. 
After all, “[i]t is this Court’s responsibility to say what 
a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the 
duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the 
governing rule of law.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994).
A. Many Courts Have Construed The CDA To 
Provide Sweeping Immunity For Websites’ 
Own Wrongful Conduct That Is Wholly At 
Odds With The CDA’s Text and Purpose
The courts that have construed the CDA as a barrier 
to civil recourse have eschewed this Court’s instruction 
that the interpretive enterprise in construing a federal 
statute is not “to assess the consequences of each approach 
and adopt the one that produces the least mischief,” but “to 
4.  bryan A. Liang & tim Mackey, Searching for Safety: 
Addressing Search Engine, Website, and Provider Accountability 
for Illicit Online Drug Sales, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 125, 126 (2009).
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give effect to the law Congress enacted.” Lewis v. City of 
Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 217 (2010). Plainly, Congress enacted 
Section 230 to serve a dual purpose: (1) to shield websites 
and internet service providers (“ISPs”) from liability for 
displaying offensive and defamatory content posted by 
others, which it accomplishes by stating that websites and 
ISPs shall not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider,” and (2) to encourage websites and ISPs to take 
proactive steps to limit or eliminate access to offensive or 
pornographic content, which it addresses by prohibiting 
civil liability against websites and ISPs for voluntary, good 
faith actions to restrict access to objectionable material. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (2); see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, 
at 194 (1996). 
A court’s job “is to follow the text.” Baker Botts L.L.P. 
v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015). Courts 
that have narrowly construed CDA protections have 
been faithful to that principle. They agree that “the plain 
language of the [CDA] creates a defense when there is 
(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service 
(2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law 
cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of information 
(3) that is provided by another information content 
provider.” J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 
184 Wash.2d 95, 104 (2015) (concurring). they agree that 
nothing in the language of the CDA’s bar on “treat[ing]” 
website providers as publishers or speakers of third party 
information shields websites from liability for their own 
conduct or content, or from liability that does not “treat” 
them as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.
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Nothing in the CDA’s text prevents holding a 
business liable for negligently or intentionally creating 
an unreasonably dangerous website marketplace, or 
negligently designing a website, or creating dangerous 
content like Armslist’s warning and search functions, 
as none of those theories seek to treat the website as a 
publisher or speaker of third party content. Yet that is 
what the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and several other 
courts have held, construing the CDA as immunizing 
online businesses from any wrongdoing so long as one 
causal factor of the harm was publication of a third party 
post. That is not what the CDA says. 
It is never appropriate to read a federal statute to 
provide greater immunity than its language or purpose 
warrants, but such an overreach is especially inappropriate 
given the history of the CDA. When Congress enacted 
the CDA in 1996, the Internet was in its infancy, “a 
fragile new means of communication that could easily 
be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement 
of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar 
businesses.” Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n. 
15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Roommates.com”). Today, internet 
companies are some of the largest in the world, more 
than capable of withstanding tort liability for their own 
wrongful conduct that every other industry must endure. 
B. Courts Are Construing The CDA Contrary To 
Congressional Intent
Statements by sponsors of the CDA show that the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 230 
is contrary to Congressional intent. Christopher Cox, 
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a former Congressman who co-sponsored Section 230, 
observed “how many Section 230 rulings have cited other 
rulings instead of the actual statute, stretching the law,” 
and that “websites that are ‘involved in soliciting’ unlawful 
materials or ‘connected to unlawful activity’ should not 
be immune under Section 230.’”5 Senator ron Wyden, the 
other co-sponsor of Section 230, has similarly emphasized 
that “[t]he real key to Section 230 . . . was making sure 
that companies in return for that protection—that 
they wouldn’t be sued indiscriminately—were being 
responsible in terms of policing their platforms.” Id. 
Explaining his goals for Section 230, Senator Wyden 
said, “I wanted to guarantee that bad actors would still 
be subject to federal law. Whether the criminals were 
operating on a street corner or online wasn’t going to make 
a difference.”6 Moreover, Senator Richard Blumenthal 
recently confirmed that he “disagree[s] with the courts 
that have held that the Communications Decency Act 
immunizes online firearm sales—like Armslist—for 
facilitating illegal gun sales. *** [N]obody should infer 
that Congress believes they were rightly decided.” Cong. 
Record Volume 164, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 21, 
2018) at p. S1852. 
5.  Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook, 
Google Is About To Change, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018), available at http://
www/npr/org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/591622450/
section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-
change.
6.  Ron Wyden, Floor Remarks: CDA 230 and SESTA, 
Medium (Mar. 21, 2018), available at http://medium.com/@
RonWyden/floor-remarks-cda-230-and-sesta-32355d669a6e.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision directly 
contradicts Congressional intent behind Section 230.
II. Review Is Needed To Resolve Sharp Disagreement 
Over CDA Protections Between Federal Courts Of 
Appeal, As Well As State Courts Of Last Resort  
State courts of last resort and federal courts of appeal 
disagree over virtually every aspect of what the CDA 
means, and what, if any, immunity it provides. As these 
conflicting views form the basis of rulings that the CDA 
provides sweeping immunity, they have and will continue to 
produce disparate and inconsistent rulings across courts. 
A website accessible nationwide may find itself subject 
to liability in Washington, but immune in Wisconsin – 
on the basis of a federal law with a supposedly uniform 
meaning. This Court’s review is needed to resolve the 
inconsistencies, and provide an authoritative construction 
of the CDA that does not rewrite its language, subvert 
Congressional intent, or excessively infringe on state 
authority.
A. Courts Disagree Over Whether the CDA 
Creates Immunity. 
Courts disagree over whether the CDA creates 
sweeping immunity or no immunity at all. Many courts 
have relied on the Fourth Circuit, which has historically 
taken a broad approach to the CDA,7 especially its 
holding in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. that “[b]y its 
plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any 
7.  As noted in Section II.c. infra, the Fourth Circuit’s 
approach appears to have narrowed recently.
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cause of action that would make service providers liable 
for information originating with a third party user of 
the service.” 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis 
added). The Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly held 
that Section 230(c)(1) “immuniz[es] interactive computer 
service providers from liability for publishing third-party 
content.” App. A at 10a.
Directly contradicting the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the CDA creates immunity “by its plain language[,]” 
129 F.3d at 330, others courts have accurately observed 
that “immunity” appears nowhere in the statute. J.S., 
184 Wash. 2d at 104 (concurring); Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 (6th 
cir. 2014); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th 
Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit, which has taken a narrow 
approach to the CDA, held that “subsection (c)(1) does not 
create an ‘immunity’ of any kind[,]” but rather “limits who 
may be called the publisher of information that appears 
online.” City of Chicago v. Stubhub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 
366 (7th Cir. 2010). 
B. Courts Disagree Over What Is An “Information 
Content Provider” 
As the CDA only precludes treatment as a publisher 
or speaker “of any information provided by another 
information content provider,” who is an information 
content provider is critical in determining the law’s reach. 
Section 230(f)(3) of the CDA defines “information content 
provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any 
interactive computer service.” However, there is stark 
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disagreement concerning what qualifies as content, what 
it means to “develop” information, and whether and how 
a party’s intent factors into the analysis. 
1. Courts Disagree Over What Constitutes 
“Development”
In Roommates.com, the Ninth circuit recognized 
that websites that display content of others can also be 
content providers who are subject to liability permissible 
under the CDA:
[a] website operator can be both a service 
provider and a content provider: If it passively 
displays content that is created entirely by third 
parties, then it is only a service provider with 
respect to that content. But as to content that it 
creates itself, or is “responsible, in whole or in 
part” for creating or developing, the website is 
also a content provider. Thus, a website may be 
immune from liability for some of the content it 
displays to the public but be subject to liability 
for other content.
521 F.3d at 1162-63. According to the Ninth Circuit, to 
determine if a service provider “developed” unlawful 
content, courts should apply a “material contribution 
test,” under which a service provider “falls within the 
exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the 
alleged illegality of the conduct.” 521 F.3d at 1167-68. The 
Ninth Circuit elaborated that “providing neutral tools to 
carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does 
not amount to ‘development’ for purposes of the immunity 
exception.” Id. at 1169. But “material contribution” and 
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“neutral tools” appear nowhere in the CDA, and these 
tests or standards, invented by the Ninth Circuit, have 
taken on a life of their own as they have been applied 
haphazardly across jurisdictions.
Many courts have expressly adopted the material 
contribution test in one form or another, including the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court (App. A at 14a-23a), the 
Washington Supreme Court (J.S., 184 Wash. 2d at 103), 
the Second circuit (F.T.C. v. Leadclick Media, LLC, 838 
F.3d 158, 176 (2d Cir. 2016)), the Sixth Circuit (Jones, 755 
F.3d at 413) and the Tenth Circuit (F.T.C. v. Accusearch 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2009)). Others have 
not done so. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 
1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 
742 (7th cir. 2016); Stubhub!, 624 F.3d at 366; Johnson v. 
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 790-92 (8th Cir. 2010). Still others 
have declined to determine whether to apply it. Shiamili 
v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281, 
289-90 (2011). 
Moreover, even among those expressly adopting 
the material contribution test, there is disagreement 
regarding when it applies. Compare J.S., 184 Wash. 2d at 
103; App. A at 39a fn.4. As the Court of Appeals of New 
York recognized, “[i]t may be difficult in certain cases to 
determine whether a service provider is also a content 
provider, particularly since the definition of ‘content 
provider’ is so elastic, and no consensus has emerged 
concerning what conduct constitutes ‘development.’” 
Shiamilli, 17 N.Y.3d at 289-90. 
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2. Courts Disagree Over Whether Website 
Design Is “Content”
State courts of last resort and federal courts of appeal 
have taken different, inconsistent positions regarding 
whether website design itself can qualify as content. As 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s dissent and the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals recognized, Yasmeen Daniel does not 
seek to hold Armslist liable for any content created by 
a third party. App. A at 38a; App. B at 60a-61a. Rather, 
the complaint “alleges that Armslist is liable for its own 
content, i.e., the design and search functionality of its 
website.” App. A at 38a. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rejected this position. In doing so, the Court reached 
a conclusion that appears contrary to those of the 
Washington Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit.8 
In J.S., 184 Wash. 2d 95, the Washington Supreme 
Court, sitting en banc, recognized that an ISP can be 
liable for its own website design and content, even if one 
cause of the harm was a third-party post, holding that 
the CDA did not bar as a matter of law claims against a 
website operator alleged to have specifically designed its 
website posting rules to induce sex trafficking. 184 Wash. 
2d at 101-103. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that 
a website’s business practices or design can be the basis 
for a claim not barred by the CDA. See Stubhub!, 624 F.3d 
at 364-66 (website’s decision to not include tax collection 
function on website not entitled to CDA immunity).
8.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court did acknowledge that the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that Armslist.com’s “design 
features could be characterized as ‘content’ created by Armslist, 
so Daniel’s claims did not require the court to treat Armslist as 
the publisher of third-party content.” App. A at 7a.
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However, the D.C. Circuit recently implied the opposite 
holding that “[t]he decision to present this third-party data 
in a particular format…and the choice of presentation does 
not itself convert the search engine into an information 
content provider.” Marshall’s Locksmith Service Inc. v. 
Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
Other Circuit Courts have addressed allegations 
regarding website design by focusing on whether the 
design helps develop third party content, without deciding 
whether that website design constitutes actionable 
content. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.
com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009); Jane Doe No. 
1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2016). 
3. Courts Disagree Over Whether Intent Can 
Support CDA Liability
The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and Washington, 
and federal circuits, also disagree over whether a website 
creator’s or operator’s intent is relevant in deciding 
whether the CDA bars claims as a matter of law. 
The Washington Supreme Court indicated that intent 
is relevant, holding that “[i]t [was] important to ascertain 
whether in fact [the website operator] designed its posting 
rules to induce sex trafficking to determine whether [the 
website operator] is subject to suit under the CDA because 
‘a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus 
falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes 
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.’” J.S., 
184 Wash. 2d at 103 (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1168). 
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Yet the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly rejected 
this decision, holding that “the Washington Supreme 
Court ignored the text of the CDA, and the overwhelming 
majority of the cases interpreting it, by inserting an intent 
exception into § 230(c)(1).” App. A at 27a. According to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, “[u]nderlying this statement 
is the implicit assumption that a website operator’s 
subjective knowledge or intent may transform what would 
otherwise be a neutral tool into a ‘material contribution’ 
to the unlawfulness of third-party content[,]” which is 
an assumption that “has no basis in the text of § 230(c)
(1).” Id. In direct conflict with the Washington Supreme 
Court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined “[t]hat 
Armslist may have known that its site could facilitate 
illegal gun sales does not change the result. Because 
§ 230(c)(1) contains no good faith requirement, courts do 
not allow allegations of intent or knowledge to defeat a 
motion to dismiss.” App. A at 28a. 
Federal courts of appeal are similarly divided. 
According to the First Circuit’s holding in Jane Doe No. 1, 
on which the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied, allegations 
regarding a website creator’s intent are “a distinction 
without a difference.” 817 F.3d at 21; App. A at 21a-22a. 
But the First Circuit’s discussion of intent appears to 
concern whether the claims treated the website operator 
as a publisher of third party content, not whether it 
qualified as an information content provider. The Sixth 
Circuit has also questioned whether intent is relevant. 
Jones, 755 F.3d at 413–14. 
Other Circuits have taken a contrary position, 
indicating that intent is relevant to the analysis of whether 
a party developed content so as to qualify as an information 
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content provider. For example, in F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 
570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009), the Tenth Circuit rejected 
Accusearch’s “attempts to portray itself as a provider of 
neutral tools,” holding that “Accusearch’s actions were 
not ‘neutral’ with respect to generating offensive content; 
on the contrary, its actions were intended to generate 
such content.” 570 F.3d at 1200-01 (emphasis added). 
According to the 10th Circuit, “the offensive postings were 
Accusearch’s raison d’etre and it affirmatively solicited 
them.” 570 F.3d at 1200. 
The Second Circuit has also indicated that intent 
is relevant. F.T.C. v. Leadclick Media, LLC, held that 
Leadclick was “not entitled to immunity because it 
participated in the development of the deceptive content 
posted on fake news pages” where it paid affiliates to 
advertise “‘knowing that false news sites were common 
in the industry.’” 838 F.3d at 176.  
The Eighth Circuit has also acknowledged that intent 
may be relevant to the CDA analysis, and recognized 
that courts, including the Seventh Circuit, take intent 
into account when determining whether the CDA bars 
particular claims. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 791-92 (noting 
that the Seventh Circuit permits liability under § 230(c)
(1) for “ISPs that intentionally designed their systems to 
facilitate illegal acts, such as stealing music.”). 
Furthermore, while the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
purported to adopt the “material contribution” test set 
forth by the Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com, as well as 
that court’s related “neutral tools” analysis, it reached 
an outcome that cannot be harmonized with the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision. In holding that Armslist’s intent in 
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designing and operating its site was irrelevant to the 
CDA analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the 
opposite conclusion of the Ninth Circuit, which held that 
websites “designed to achieve illegal ends[,]” would not 
be protected by the CDA. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 
1167.  
C. Courts Disagree Over What Is Meant By 
“Treating” A Website Operator As The 
Publisher Of Third Party Content
State courts of last resort and the federal circuit 
courts of appeal disagree over what it means to “treat[] 
[a website] as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider,” § 230, 
which results in contrary conclusions regarding what 
claims the CDA allows.
The Fourth Circuit created an “editorial functions” 
test for CDA analysis, holding that “lawsuits seeking 
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content—are barred.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also 
Nemet, 591 F.3d at 258. 
Yet not all courts have adopted the “traditional 
editorial functions” standard. See Huon, 841 F.3d at 
743. And even those that do, do not always agree when it 
applies. See, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 410 (“***some state 
tort claims will lie against website operators acting in 
their publishing, editorial, or screening capacities.”); Jane 
Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21 (“Features *** which reflect 
choices about what content can appear on the website 
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and in what form, are editorial choices that fall within the 
purview of traditional publisher functions.”); Universal 
Communication Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 422 
(1st cir. 2007) (disagreeing with argument “that the 
prohibition against treating Lycos ‘as the publisher’ only 
immunizes Lycos’s ‘exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content,’ and not its decisions 
regarding the ‘construct and operation’ of its web sites”) 
(internal citation omitted); F.T.C. v. LeadClick Media, 
LLC, 838 F.3d at 176 (holding that CDA did not apply 
where LeadClick was “being held accountable for its own 
deceptive acts or practices” (emphasis in original); Green 
v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3rd Cir. 2003) 
(Section 230 proscribes liability for a claim “that AOL was 
negligent in promulgating harmful content and in failing 
to address certain harmful content on its network”); Ben 
Ezra, Weinstein & Company, Inc. v. America Online 
Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Congress clearly 
enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability 
on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and 
self-regulatory functions.”). 
In this respect, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 
decision conflicts with decisions by the California and 
Washington Supreme Courts. In Hassell v. Bird, 5 Cal. 5th 
522 (2018), the California Supreme Court held that while 
a court order directing Yelp to remove certain consumer 
reviews posted on its website was invalid under the CDA, 
“not all legal duties owed by Internet intermediaries 
necessarily treat them as the publishers of third party 
content, even when these obligations are in some way 
associated with their publication of this material.” 5 Cal. 
5th at 526, 543. 
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The Washington Supreme Court took a narrower 
approach. The concurrence explained that allegations 
that a website “deliberately designed its posting rules 
in a manner that would enable pimps to engage in sex 
trafficking, including in the trafficking of minors, and to 
avoid law enforcement…do not suggest that [it] is being 
treated as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” J.S., 184 Wash. 2d. 
at 113 (concurring). Hassell, 5 Cal. 5th at 543, suggests 
that the California Supreme Court could reach a similar 
conclusion. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion is to the 
contrary. It held that Yasmeen’s claims were barred because 
the “duty Armslist is alleged to have violated derives from 
its role as a publisher of firearms advertisements[.]” App. 
A at 28a. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a 
website cannot be liable, even when its own conduct is 
alleged to have caused harm, “when the underlying basis 
for liability is unlawful third party content published by 
the defendant.” App. A at 24a. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court read the CDA far more broadly than the California 
and Washington Supreme Courts. 
Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the First Circuit 
has taken an overbroad approach to what it means to treat 
an ISP as the publisher of third party content under the 
cDA. In Lycos, the First Circuit, applying the “traditional 
editorial functions” standard, held that “[i]f the cause of 
action is one that would treat the service provider as the 
publisher of a particular posting, immunity applies not 
only for the service provider’s decisions with respect to 
that posting, but also for its inherent decisions about how 
to treat postings generally.” 478 F.3d at 422 (rejecting 
argument that ISP is not immunized for “its decisions 
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regarding the ‘construct and operation’ of its websites”). 
In Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d 12, the First Circuit held 
that the CDA broadly shielded a website from claims 
brought by victims of sex trafficking even if the website’s 
design and operations induced illegal postings, because 
“[f]eatures such as these, which reflect choices about what 
content can appear on the website and in what form, are 
editorial choices that fall within the purview of traditional 
publisher functions,” and are precluded by the CDA. 817 
F.3d at 21-22. 
In contrast to the first circuit and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, other federal courts of appeal have taken a 
more narrow approach to whether a claim treats an ISP as 
the publisher of third party content, holding that the CDA 
does not protect website operators from liability for their 
own conduct, even where the claims involve the publication 
of third party content. For example, the Seventh Circuit, 
without applying the traditional editorial functions test, 
held that Section 230(c)(1) was “irrelevant” to a claim 
that Stubhub!, an online marketplace for tickets, failed to 
collect a city amusement tax because, unlike claims “for 
defamation, obscenity or copyright infringement,” the 
amusement tax law “does not depend on who ‘publishes’ 
any information or is a ‘speaker.’” StubHub!, 624 F.3d 
at 366. The CDA did not bar liability even though it was 
based on StubHub!’s failure to collect taxes on tickets 
posted for sale by third parties.9 thus, in contrast to 
9.  Notably, while the First Circuit in Jane Doe No. 1, 817 
F.3d at 21 n.5, rejected the Washington Supreme Court’s decision 
in J.S., the Seventh Circuit has rejected the First Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of the CDA as outlined in Lycos, 478 F.3d at 413. 
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2008).
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the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
business decisions concerning the operation of an online 
marketplace are not necessarily, or inherently, publisher 
functions protected by the CDA.
The Ninth Circuit also narrowly construed CDA 
immunity in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 
851 (9th Cir. 2016), which held that the CDA did not bar 
a failure to warn claim against a website that published 
third-party posts, as the liability theory was not based on 
its publishing of third party content. As the Ninth Circuit 
explained, “Congress has not provided an all-purpose 
get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish 
user content on the internet, though any claims might 
have a marginal chilling effect on internet publishing 
businesses.” Id. at 853. The Ninth Circuit reached that 
conclusion despite the fact that “[p]ublishing activity 
[was] a but-for cause of just about everything [the website] 
[was] involved in” and even where the website “[was] an 
internet publishing business” which “[w]ithout publishing 
user content…would not exist.” Id. at 853. This ruling 
was consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s earlier ruling in 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d at 1103, 1109, holding that 
the CDA barred plaintiff’s negligent undertaking claim 
but not its promissory estoppel claim. 
Most recently, in HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of 
Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth 
Circuit again took a narrow view of what it means to treat 
a party as a publisher or speaker of third party content. 
918 F.3d at 682. In holding that an ordinance prohibiting 
short-term housing rentals was not preempted by the 
CDA, the Ninth Circuit explained that courts should 
decide CDA protection by examining the duty at issue 
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in the case, not simply whether a website publisher is 
involved:
We do not read Internet Brands to suggest 
that CDA immunity attaches any time a legal 
duty might lead a company to respond with 
monitoring or other publication activities. It is 
not enough that third-party content is involved; 
Internet Brands rejected use of a “but-for” 
test that would provide immunity under the 
CDA solely because a cause of action would not 
otherwise have accrued but for the third-party 
content. We look instead to what the duty at 
issue actually requires: specifically, whether 
the duty would necessarily require an internet 
company to monitor third-party content.
HomeAway.com, 918 F.3d at 682. The Ninth Circuit 
recognized that websites could be liable for failing to 
screen persons who interact with the website so long as 
it did not require monitoring public posts:
the Ordinance does not require the Platforms 
to monitor third-party content and thus falls 
outside of the CDA’s immunity. *** Rather, 
the only monitoring that appears necessary 
in order to comply with the Ordinance relates 
to incoming requests to complete a booking 
transaction—content that, while resulting from 
the third-party listings, is distinct, internal, 
and nonpublic. As in Internet Brands, it is not 
enough that the third-party listings are a “but-
for” cause of such internal monitoring.
Id. 
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This language from the Ninth Circuit suggests that 
Armslist could be held liable for allowing illegal buyers 
and sellers who had no legitimate business on the site. 
Directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Homeaway, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 
the CDA barred Yasmeen’s negligence claim because 
“[r]estated, it alleges that Armslist provided an online 
forum for third-party content and failed to adequately 
monitor that content.” App. A at 28a. But under the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, Armslist would only be protected if 
Armslist would necessarily be required to monitor third-
party content, which is not the case. HomeAway.com, 918 
F.3d at 682.10 
As more evidence of the confusion in CDA case law, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on a Ninth Circuit 
decision – Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. – in holding that “courts 
must ask whether the duty that plaintiff alleges defendant 
violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as 
a ‘publisher or speaker’” and “[i]f it does, section 230(c)
(1) precludes liability.” App. A at 24a (citing 570 F.3d at 
1102). However, the broad scope of Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s ruling conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s narrower 
conclusion that “[l]ooking at the text, it appears clear that 
neither [230(c)(1)] nor any other [subsection] declares a 
general immunity from liability deriving from third-party 
content.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d at 1100.
10.  Armslist would not be required to monitor third-party 
content if, for example, it required users to register before buying 
a gun and to take delivery of firearms only through a federally 
licensed firearms dealer as Yasmeen alleges Gunbroker.com does. 
App. B at 50a-51a.
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Moreover, what the CDA means in the Fourth Circuit 
is confusing. While the court previously took a broader 
approach to the CDA than the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, 
recently the Fourth Circuit held that “to implicate the 
immunity of § 230(c)(1), a claim must be based on the 
interactive computer service provider’s publication of a 
third party’s speech.” Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
925 F.3d 135, 139 (4th Cir. 2019). Using that standard, 
the Fourth Circuit held that the CDA did not bar product 
liability claims asserted against Amazon because the 
claims were “not based on the publication of another’s 
speech.” Id. 
More conflict comes from a Third Circuit decision 
this month that held the CDA did not bar negligence and 
strict liability claims against Amazon, holding that while 
“Amazon exercises online editorial functions,” the claims 
did not “seek to treat Amazon as the publisher or speaker 
of information provided by another information content 
provider.” Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 18-1041, 
2019 WL 2849153, at *11-12 (3d Cir. Jul 3, 2019). That 
is precisely what Petitioner argues here and what the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected. 
III. Review Is Warranted To Ensure That This Court’s 
Federalism Precedent Is Followed 
A. This Court’s Federalism Precedent Requires 
Reading The CDA Narrowly To Minimize The 
Degree To Which Federal Law Overrides State 
Law
This Court has made clear that “[i]t is incumbent 
upon the [] courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before 
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finding that federal law overrides [the usual constitutional 
balance of federal and state powers]” by supplanting 
state law. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. Even when 
a statute’s “express language” mandates some degree 
of preemption, the “presumption [against preemption] 
reinforces the appropriateness of a narrow reading” of the 
“scope” of the preemption. Cipollone, 505 u.S. at 517-18; 
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. This approach is “consistent 
with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy 
of state regulation of matters of health and safety.” 
Medtronic, 518 u.S. at 485. 
Gregory and Bond show how federal laws must be 
read to preserve state authority. Gregory applied the clear 
statement rule to find that a federal anti-age discrimination 
law allowed Missouri’s mandatory retirement for judges, 
holding that judges were excluded from the law because 
they were “‘appointee[s] on the policymaking level.’” 501 
U.S. at 464-65. Even though this was “an odd way for 
Congress to exclude judges,” “particularly in the context 
of the other exceptions that surround [the exclusion 
applicable to judges],” the Court could not be “absolutely 
certain” about Congress’ intent to include judges within 
the federal statute. See id. at 467. 
In Bond, “it was clear beyond doubt” that a defendant 
violated a federal law, 134 S.Ct. at 2094 (Scalia J., 
concurrence), but because a plain reading would lead to 
the federal government “‘dramatically intrud[ing] upon 
traditional state criminal jurisdiction,’” the Court found 
that “ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach 
of the key statutory definition” and did not apply it. Id. 
at 2088 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 350), 2090. The Court 
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rejected a reading that “would ‘alter sensitive federal-
state relationships ***.’” 134 S. Ct. at 2091-92 (quoting 
earlier Bond decision).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals cited Medtronic 
and Gregory in finding that the presumption against 
preemption and clear statement rules support interpreting 
the CDA as not barring Petitioner’s claims. App. B at 
58a-68a. The Court found it significant that in the CDA 
“Congress limited immunity to a single circumstance: 
when a theory of liability treats the website creator or 
operator ‘as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.’” App. 
B at 63a (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). 
As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly 
recognized, the CDA comes nowhere close to clearly 
stating that claims like Petitioner’s are barred. App. B at 
58a-68a. The CDA states that ISPs may not be treated 
“as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider” (§ 230(c)(1) 
(emphasis added)), not that websites cannot be held liable 
if “treat[ed]” as a website designer or creator of content 
that causes harm. Honing in on this critical distinction, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals observed that Plaintiff’s 
“claims and the supporting allegations do not seek to 
hold Armslist liable for publishing another’s information 
content. Instead, the claims seek to hold Armslist liable 
for its own alleged actions in designing and operating 
its website in ways that caused injuries.” App. B at 68a 
(emphasis added). Applying Bond, Gregory, Cipollone, 
and Medtronic, the CDA allows Petitioner’s claims to 
proceed. 
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B. The Supreme Court Of Wisconsin Refused To 
Apply The Federalism Principles Mandated By 
This Court 
Petitioner and the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin 
squarely presented the necessity of applying this Court’s 
federalism lens to the interpretation of the CDA. App. B 
at 58a-59a; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 13, 19-20 (Sup. 
Ct. Wis., Jan. 8, 2019). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin ignored this Court’s teachings and failed 
to even reference any of these cases. Effectively, this 
Court’s federalism precedent is null and void in Wisconsin, 
at least when the CDA is considered. Indeed, virtually all 
courts construing the CDA have similarly ignored and 
failed to apply the clear statement rule or any federalism 
principles.
Such defiance of this Court’s precedent should not 
stand, especially when core principles of federalism and 
state sovereignty are at stake. State and federal courts 
should not feel entitled to simply disregard this Court’s 
teachings and adopt their own approaches to statutory 
interpretation – even when faced with this Court’s plainly 
applicable precedent, and core principles of federalism are 
subverted. Federalism is not a permissive principle. This 
Court’s precedent cannot be disregarded when courts find 
it inconvenient.
IV. Review Is Warranted Because The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s Interpretation Of The CDA 
Creates A “Lawless No Man’s Land” On The 
Internet
The CDA was not intended “to create a lawless no-
man’s-land on the internet.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
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at 1164; see also United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 
3d 540, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Even a quick reading of 
the statute makes it clear that it is not intended to apply 
to … intentional and criminal acts.”). Yet the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s decision opens the door to exactly that, 
immunizing dangerous conduct that would be subject 
to liability if it occurred in real space. According to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, people could intentionally 
facilitate crimes from drug trafficking to terrorism 
to gun trafficking, for profit, and so long as one of the 
causal factors of the harm they created was an online 
posting by a third party, states would be powerless to 
subject them to civil liability for their misconduct. Indeed, 
under the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, even the 
creator of the website “Silk Road,” who was convicted of 
seven criminal charges, including narcotics and money 
laundering conspiracies, for designing a “sophisticated 
and extensive [Internet] criminal marketplace” that 
enabled thousands of individuals to anonymously transact 
in illegal drugs without detection, would be immunized 
from liability to any individual harmed by its illegal acts. 
See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Jury verdict, Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 
540 (Feb. 5, 2015). 
Congress enacted the CDA in the early days of the 
Internet to allow it to grow while keeping objectionable 
materials from children. 141 Cong. Rec. S8087 (daily ed. 
June 9, 1995); 47 U.S.C. § 230(a); 141 Cong. Rec. H4869-
70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). A desire 
to nurture online commerce may have led to some of the 
early expansive readings of the CDA.11 But even over a 
11.  See gregory M. Dickinson, Note, An Interpretive 
Framework for Narrower Immunity Under Section 230 of the 
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decade ago the Ninth Circuit observed that “[t]he Internet 
is no longer a fragile new means of communication that 
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous 
enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to 
brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has become a 
dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through 
which commerce is conducted.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
at 1164, n. 15. That is only more true today. 
Given the pervasiveness of the Internet, and the extent 
to which it reaches into our everyday lives, extending 
Section 230 to immunize websites that intentionally profit 
from tortious or criminal conduct, as Armslist does, has 
dangerous and far reaching implications. As the Ninth 
Circuit explained in refusing to exempt websites from the 
obligation to “comply with laws of general applicability,” 
the Internet’s “vast reach into the lives of millions is 
exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of 
the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online 
businesses an unfair advantage over their real-world 
counterparts, which must comply with laws of general 
applicability.” Id. The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated 
that “allowing internet companies to claim CDA immunity 
under these circumstances would risk exempting them 
from most local regulations and would… ‘create a lawless 
no-man’s-land on the Internet.’” HomeAway.com, Inc. 
918 F.3d at 683 (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164). 
Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, 
which protects a website owner and operator from civil 
liability for its own negligent and intentional actions in 
Communications Decency Act, 33 harv. J.L. & PuB. PoL’y 863, 
873-74 (2010).
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designing and operating its website to encourage and 
facilitate illegal and tortious activity, and those like 
it, threatens to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the 
Internet in which conduct that could be subject to liability 
– and potential criminal prosecution – in real space, would 
be immune in cyberspace. Such a decision sends a message 
to criminal and other dangerous enterprises to set up shop 
online. Congress had no such intention, nor did it express 
any in the cDA. 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of 
certiorari should be granted.
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coURt of Wisconsin, filed ApRil 30, 2019
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
No. 2017AP344
YASMEEN DANIEL, Individually, and as Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Zina Daniel Haughton, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY  
OF CONNECTICUT, as Subrogee for Jalisco’s LLC, 
Intervening-Plaintiff, 
v. 
ARMSLIST, LLC, an Oklahoma Limited  
Liability Company, BRIAN MANCINI  
and JONATHAN GIBBON, 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
BROC ELMORE, ABC INSURANCE CO., the 
fictitious name for an unknown insurance company, 
DEF INSURANCE CO., the fictitious name for 
an unknown insurance company and ESTATE 
OF RADCLIFFE HAUGHTON, by his Special 
Administrator JENNIFER VALENTI, 
Defendants, 
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PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Intervening-Defendant.
April 30, 2019, Filed
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS. Reversed. 
¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. We 
review a decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
circuit court’s2 dismissal of Yasmeen Daniel’s complaint 
against Brian Mancini, Jonathan Gibbon, and Armslist, 
LLC (collectively “Armslist”). Daniel’s tort action 
arose from a mass shooting in a Brookfield, Wisconsin 
spa that killed four people, including Daniel’s mother 
Zina Daniel Haughton. Daniel alleged that the shooter, 
Radcliffe Haughton, illegally purchased the firearm 
after responding to private seller Devin Linn’s post on 
Armslist’s firearm advertising website, armslist.com. 
The court of appeals held that 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018),3 the 
federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), did 
not bar Daniel’s claims against Armslist for facilitating 
Radcliffe’s illegal purchase.
1. Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 2018 WI App 32, 382 Wis. 2d 
241, 913 N.W.2d 211.
2. The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro of Milwaukee County 
presided.
3. All references to federal statutes are to the 2018 version 
unless otherwise noted.
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¶2 We disagree, and conclude that § 230(c)(1) requires 
us to dismiss Daniel’s complaint against Armslist. 
Section 230(c)(1) prohibits claims that treat Armslist, an 
interactive computer service provider,4 as the publisher 
or speaker of information posted by a third party on its 
website. Because all of Daniel’s claims for relief require 
Armslist to be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
information posted by third parties on armslist.com, her 
claims are barred by § 230(c)(1). Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals, and affirm the circuit 
court’s dismissal of Daniel’s complaint.
i. Background5
¶3 In October 2012, a Wisconsin court granted 
Zina Daniel Haughton a restraining order against her 
husband, Radcliffe Haughton, after he had assaulted her 
and threatened to kill her. Pursuant to the restraining 
order, Radcliffe was prohibited by law from possessing 
a firearm for four years. See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(f) 
4. An “interactive computer service” is “any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered 
by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). It 
is uncontested that Armslist is an interactive computer service 
provider.
5. Because we review defendant Armslist, LLC’s motion 
to dismiss, we accept all of the factual allegations in Daniel’s 
complaint as true. See Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers 
LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶17, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.
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(2017-18).6 Despite this court order, Radcliffe posted a 
“want to buy” advertisement on armslist.com and stated 
that he was seeking to buy a handgun with a high-capacity 
magazine “asap.” He then viewed an offer of sale posted 
by Devin Linn on armslist.com for a semiautomatic 
handgun. Using armslist.com’s “contact” function, he 
emailed Linn to arrange to purchase the handgun. The 
two exchanged phone numbers and set up a meeting by 
phone. On October 20, they met in a McDonald’s parking 
lot in Germantown, Wisconsin. Linn sold Radcliffe the 
gun, along with ammunition, for $500.
¶4 On October 21, one day after Radcliffe had 
purchased the handgun from Linn, he carried it into the 
Azana Spa and Salon in Brookfield, Wisconsin, where 
Zina worked. He fatally shot Zina and two other people, 
injured four others, and shot and killed himself. Yasmeen 
Daniel was inside the building at the time and witnessed 
the shooting.
¶5 Armslist.com is a classified advertising website 
similar to Craigslist. Prospective sellers may post 
advertisements for firearms and firearm-related products 
they wish to sell, prospective buyers may post “want 
advertisements” describing the firearms they wish to buy. 
Buyers and sellers may contact one another either through 
personal contact information they provide on the website, 
or by using armslist.com’s “contact” tool. According to the 
complaint, Armslist receives revenue through advertising 
6. All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.
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on armslist.com; there is no allegation that Armslist 
itself participates in the purchase and sale of firearms 
beyond allowing users to post and view advertisements 
and contact information on armslist.com.
¶6 According to Daniel’s allegations, Radcliffe 
shopped for the murder weapon exclusively on armslist.
com because he recognized that the website’s design 
features made it easier for prohibited purchasers like 
him to illegally purchase firearms. Armslist.com allows 
potential buyers to use a “seller” search filter to specify 
that they want to buy firearms only from private sellers, 
rather than from federally licensed dealers. Private 
sellers, as opposed to federally licensed gun dealers, are 
not required to conduct background checks in Wisconsin. 
The website also does not require buyers or sellers 
to create accounts, which encourages anonymity, and 
displays next to each advertisement whether the account 
is registered or unregistered.
¶7 Armslist.com allows users to flag content for 
a number of different reasons, including “scam,” 
“miscategorized,” and “overpriced,” and uses these flags 
to delete certain posts. However, it does not allow users 
to flag content as “criminal” or “illegal” and does not take 
action to delete illegal content. The website contains no 
restrictions on who may create an account, or who may 
view or publish firearm advertisements using its website. 
The website’s lack of restrictions allows buyers to avoid 
state-mandated waiting periods and other requirements. 
Armslist does not provide private sellers with legal 
guidance as to federal and state laws governing the sale 
of firearms.
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¶8 Daniel’s complaint also suggests several simple 
measures Armslist could have taken in order to reduce 
the known risk of illegal firearm sales to dangerous 
prohibited purchasers. Daniel alleges that Armslist could 
have required buyers to create accounts and provide 
information such as their name, address, and phone 
number. In states similar to Wisconsin, where there is 
online access to an individual’s criminal history, Armslist 
could have required potential buyers to upload their 
criminal history before their accounts were approved. 
She alleges Armslist could have allowed users to flag 
potentially illegal firearm sales. It could have prohibited 
users from obtaining one another’s contact information 
until Armslist confirmed their legal eligibility to buy 
and sell firearms. According to the complaint, all these 
measures would have reduced the risk of firearm sales to 
persons prohibited from owning a firearm.
¶9 Based on all these features and omissions, Daniel’s 
complaint alleges that Armslist knew or should have 
known that its website would put firearms in the hands 
of dangerous, prohibited purchasers, and that Armslist 
specifically designed its website to facilitate illegal 
transactions. The causes of action asserted against 
Armslist are negligence, negligence per se, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting tortious conduct, public nuisance, and wrongful 
death.7 Armslist argued that the CDA immunizes it from 
liability for the information posted by third parties on 
7. The complaint also asserts causes of action against Devin 
Linn and the Radcliffe Haughton Estate that are not at issue here.
Appendix A
7a
armslist.com, and moved to dismiss Daniel’s complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)6.
¶10 The circuit court granted Armslist’s motion and 
dismissed the complaint. The circuit court explained that 
the relevant question under the CDA is not whether the 
complaint calls the defendant a publisher, but whether the 
cause of action requires the court to treat the defendant as 
the publisher of third-party content. The CDA immunizes 
an interactive computer service provider from liability 
for passively displaying content created by third parties, 
even when the operator exercises “traditional publisher 
functions” by deciding “what content can appear on the 
website and in what form.” Armslist.com’s design features 
“reflect choices about what content can appear on the 
website and in what form,” and are therefore “editorial 
choices that fall within the purview of traditional publisher 
functions.” For this reason, the circuit court concluded 
that the CDA bars all of Daniel’s claims against Armslist.
¶11 The court of appeals reversed. Daniel v. Armslist, 
LLC, 2018 WI App 32, ¶5, 382 Wis. 2d 241, 913 N.W.2d 211. 
The court of appeals held that the CDA does not protect 
a website operator from liability for its own actions in 
designing and operating its website. Id., ¶42. According 
to the court of appeals, armslist.com’s design features 
could be characterized as “content” created by Armslist, 
so Daniel’s claims did not require the court to treat 
Armslist as the publisher of third-party content. Id., ¶44. 
Additionally, holding Armslist liable for its own operation 
of its website did not require treating it as a publisher or 
speaker of third-party content. Id., ¶42.
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¶12 The court of appeals acknowledged that a large 
body of federal case law has interpreted the CDA as 
providing immunity when an interactive computer service 
provider exercises a publisher’s “traditional editorial 
functions,” such as providing a forum for third parties to 
post content. Id., ¶¶48-49. However, the court of appeals 
concluded that all of these cases “read[] into the Act 
language that is not present” and rejected them all as 
unpersuasive. Id. ¶¶48-50. We granted Armslist’s petition 
for review, and now reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.
ii. discUssion
A. standard of Review
¶13 We review a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, and in so doing we 
must interpret and apply a statute. “Whether a complaint 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted is a question 
of law for our independent review; however, we benefit 
from discussions of the court of appeals and circuit court.” 
Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 
86, ¶17, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (citation omitted). 
“When we review a motion to dismiss, factual allegations 
in the complaint are accepted as true for purposes of our 
review. However, legal conclusions asserted in a complaint 
are not accepted, and legal conclusions are insufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id., ¶18 (citations omitted). 
“Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute 
to a given set of facts are questions of law that we review 
independently,” while benefiting from the interpretations 
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and applications of other Wisconsin court decisions. 
Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 
159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.
B. the communications decency Act
¶14 The CDA is set out in 47 U.S.C. § 230. The CDA 
was enacted in large part to “to preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for 
the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” § 230(b)(2). 
Congress found that the internet had “flourished, to the 
benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation.” § 230(a)(4). For this reason, Congress sought 
to prevent state and federal laws from interfering with 
the free exchange of information over the internet.
¶15 Limiting interference from federal and state laws 
includes protecting interactive computer service providers 
who operate forums for third-party speech from the 
“specter of tort liability” for hosting third-party content. 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 
398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)). The imposition 
of tort liability for hosting third-party content would 
have an “obvious chilling effect” on the free exchange 
of information over the internet, Jones, 755 F.3d at 407 
(citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331), as it would deter interactive 
computer service providers from hosting third-party 
content. This would significantly impede the free exchange 
of information over the internet. See Jones, 755 F.3d at 408.
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¶16 Section 230(c)(1) addresses this problem by 
immunizing interactive computer service providers from 
liability for publishing third-party content. The subsection 
states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.” § 230(c)(1). The act also preempts any state 
tort claims: “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that 
is inconsistent with this section.” § 230(e)(3). Section 230(c)
(1) therefore prevents the specter of tort liability from 
undermining an interactive computer service provider’s 
willingness to host third-party content.
¶17 At the same time, however, Congress did not want 
to discourage interactive computer service providers 
from voluntarily screening obscene or unlawful third-
party content, as some state courts had done. See, e.g., 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 229, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995) (unpublished) (holding that an interactive computer 
service provider could be treated as the publisher of some 
defamatory statements posted by third parties on its site 
because it had voluntarily deleted other offensive third-
party posts). Section 230(c)(2) addresses this concern 
by shielding an interactive computer service provider 
from liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material 
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.” Section 230(c) ensures that 
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as a “Good Samaritan,” an interactive computer service 
provider may remove some objectionable third-party 
content from its website without fear of subjecting itself 
to liability for objectionable content it does not remove. 
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2008).
¶18 Therefore, rather than force interactive computer 
service providers to screen objectionable content, Congress 
chose to simply remove disincentives for screening such 
content voluntarily. See, e.g., id. at 670 (explaining that 
Congress chose to deal with the problem of liability for 
hosting third-party content “not with a sword but with a 
safety net.”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. Together, § 
230(c)(1) & (2) allow interactive computer service providers 
to be “indifferent to the content of information they host 
or transmit: whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not 
(subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability 
under either state or federal law.” Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 
519 F.3d at 670.
¶19 Section 230(c)(1) is the subsection central to this 
case. The text of subsection (c)(1) supplies three criteria 
that must be satisfied before the CDA bars a plaintiff’s 
claims: (1) the defendant “is a ‘provider or user of an 
interactive computer service’; (2) the claim is based on 
‘information provided by another information content 
provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [the defendant] ‘as 
the publisher or speaker’ of” the information. Jane Doe 
No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(citations omitted); see also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 
F.3d 1354, 1357, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 187 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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¶20 Daniel does not dispute that Armslist, LLC, as 
the operator of armslist.com, is an interactive computer 
service provider. Her arguments involve the second and 
third criteria of § 230(c)(1). She challenges the second 
criterion by arguing that Armslist, through the design 
and operation of its website, helped to develop the content 
of the firearm advertisement such that the information 
was not exclusively provided by Linn. This would make 
Armslist an information content provider with respect 
to the advertisement; and therefore, place it outside of 
the CDA’s protection. She challenges the third criterion 
by arguing that her claims are not based on Armslist’s 
publication of content at all, but are instead based on 
Armslist’s facilitation and encouragement of illegal 
firearm sales by third parties. If Daniel’s claims do not 
require Armslist to be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of Linn’s advertisement, then the CDA does not bar her 
claims.
c. information content provider
¶21 Regarding the second criterion of Section 230(c)
(1), CDA immunity exists only when the plaintiff’s claims 
are based on content provided by another information 
content provider. If a defendant is an “information content 
provider” for the content at issue, then the defendant is 
not entitled to CDA immunity. § 230(c)(1); Jones, 755 F.3d 
at 408. An information content provider is “any person 
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 
§ 230(f)(3). “A website operator can simultaneously act 
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as both a service provider and content provider.” Jones, 
755 F.3d at 408; see also Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernandino Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008). In short, an interactive computer 
service provider, such as Armslist, is not liable for 
publishing a third party’s content, but may be liable for 
publishing its own content.
¶22 A defendant is an information content provider 
with regard to content published on the internet only if 
the defendant is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development8” of the content. Section 230(f)
(3). Courts have recognized that the word “development” 
cannot be read too broadly or too narrowly. On one hand, 
an overly broad reading could render an interactive 
service provider “responsible for the development of 
content created by a third party merely by displaying 
or allowing access to it.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 409. This 
would “swallow[] up every bit of the immunity that the 
section otherwise provides,” effectively writing § 230(c)
(1)’s immunity provision out of the statute. Roommates.
com, 521 F.3d at 1167.
¶23 On the other hand, an overly narrow reading of 
the word “development” risks ignoring the phrase “in 
whole or in part.” See § 230(f)(3). It cannot be the case that 
an interactive computer service provider is categorically 
immune from liability for any exercise of its publishing, 
editorial, and screening functions; a website operator who 
8. Linn, not Armslist, created the firearm advertisement. 
The issue in this case is whether Armslist helped to “develop” the 
content of the advertisement.
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removes the word “not” from a third party’s post stating 
that “[Name] did not steal the artwork” is responsible for 
developing potentially defamatory content. Roommates.
com, 521 F.3d at 1169. For this reason, courts recognize 
that “despite the CDA, some state tort claims will lie 
against website operators acting in their publishing, 
editorial, or screening capacities.” Jones, 755 F.3d at 410.
¶24 In order to avoid these two extremes and to 
remain faithful to the text and purpose of § 230, courts 
use the “material contribution” test to determine whether 
a website operator is responsible for the “development” of 
content. “[A] website helps to develop unlawful content, 
and thus falls within [Section 230(f)(3)], if it contributes 
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168. A material contribution 
“does not mean merely taking action that is necessary to 
the display of allegedly illegal content,” such as providing 
a forum for third-party posts. Jones, 755 F.3d at 410. 
“Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the 
displayed content allegedly unlawful.” Id.
¶25 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommates.
com, 521 F.3d 1157, demonstrates how the material 
contribution test operates. Housing website Roommates.
com required users to disclose their sex, race, sexual 
orientation, and whether they will bring children to the 
household in order to use the site. Id. at 1161. It also 
required renters to list their roommate preferences 
regarding these characteristics. Id. It was illegal under 
the Fair Housing Act and California anti-discrimination 
law for renters to request this information. Id. at 1161-
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62. After selecting their preferences, users could access 
the “Additional Comments” section, a blank text box 
for users to “describe [themselves] and what [they] are 
looking for in a roommate.” Id. at 1173. Some renters 
posted discriminatory preferences in this text box, such 
as “prefer white Male roommates” or “NOT looking for 
black [M]uslims.” Id. The Fair Housing Council sued 
Roomates.com for violating the Fair Housing Act and 
state anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 1162.
¶26 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the CDA 
immunized Roommates.com from liability for the content 
of the “Additional Comments” section, but not for the 
required disclosures of characteristics like race and sex. 
Id. at 1165-67. The information posted in the “Additional 
Comments” section “comes entirely from subscribers 
and is passively displayed by Roommate.” Id. at 1174. 
Roommates.com did not contribute to the unlawfulness of 
this content, but merely provided a place for the content 
to be posted. In contrast, the required disclosures of 
protected characteristics did amount to the development 
of content, making Roommates.com an information 
content provider with respect to these disclosures. Id. at 
1167-68. By requiring users to enter characteristics and 
preferences such as age, race, sex, and sexual orientation 
as a condition of using the website, and by designing its 
website to hide listings from certain users based on these 
protected characteristics, Roommates.com materially 
contributed to the illegality of the content itself. Id. at 1169.
¶27 Decisions from other federal courts interpreting 
the CDA are helpful in distinguishing when a defendant 
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has materially contributed to the illegality of third-party 
content from when a defendant has merely published 
content created by someone else. In Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 
owners of apartment buildings posted discriminatory 
advertisements on Craigslist’s housing section in violation 
of the Fair Housing Act. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d 
at 668. Plaintiffs sued Craigslist for allegedly “causing” 
these Fair Housing Act violations. Id. at 671. The Seventh 
Circuit held that the CDA barred the plaintiffs’ claims, 
explaining that “[o]ne might as well say that people who 
save money ‘cause’ bank robbery.” Id. While Craigslist was 
responsible for the illegal content “in the sense that no one 
could post a discriminatory ad if [C]raigslist did not offer 
a forum,” id., Craigslist did not materially contribute to 
the illegality of the content.
¶28 Similarly, in Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. 
Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009), a class of plaintiffs alleged 
that Google materially contributed to the illegality of 
fraudulent advertisements posted by Google’s advertising 
customers. The claims were based on Google’s “Keyword 
Tool,” which suggested specific keywords to Google’s 
advertising customers. If an advertiser entered the word 
“ringtone,” for example, the tool suggested the phrase 
“free ringtone.” Id. at 1197. Some advertisers using this 
tool falsely advertised their ringtones as “free,” resulting 
in unauthorized charges to consumers. Id. The plaintiffs 
argued that Keyword Tool’s suggestion made Google a 
“developer” of the third-party advertisers’ fraudulent 
content. Id.
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¶ 29 The district court rejected this argument. Even 
assuming that Google was aware its Keyword Tool was 
being used to create illegal content, the Keycite Tool was 
a “neutral tool” much like the additional comments section 
in Roommates.com: it “merely provide[d] a framework that 
that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes.” Id. 
(quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172). Additionally, 
there is no good faith requirement in § 230(c)(1). Therefore, 
an interactive computer service provider will not be liable 
for providing neutral tools “even if a service provider 
knows that third parties are using such tools to create 
illegal content.” Id. at 1198 (citations omitted).
¶30 In contrast to these cases, in which the interactive 
computer service provider merely made illegal content 
more easily available, courts have denied CDA immunity 
when an interactive computer service provider materially 
contributes to the illegality of the content itself. FTC v. 
LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158 (2nd Cir. 2016), 
provides an example of a material contribution. LeadClick 
was an affiliate-marketing business that connected its 
clients to third-party publishers (affiliates), who then 
published the clients’ advertisements on the internet. 
Some of LeadClick’s affiliates used fake news websites to 
advertise a LeadClick client’s weight loss products, and 
included false and misleading information such as fake 
customer reviews. Id. at 164-65. LeadClick’s employees 
directed affiliates to make specific edits to advertisements 
in order to avoid being “crazy [misleading].” For example, 
a LeadClick employee told an affiliate to make a false 
advertisement appear “more ‘realistic’” by lowering the 
amount of falsely claimed weight loss. Id. at 176.
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¶31 The Federal Trade Commission brought an action 
for deceptive trade practices, and the Second Circuit held 
that the CDA did not immunize LeadClick. Id. LeadClick 
“developed” the unlawful advertisements by materially 
contributing to the illegality of the deceptive content, 
making it an information content provider of the content 
at issue. Id. For this reason, the claim was not based on 
content provided by another information content provider, 
and accordingly, there was no CDA immunity. Id.
¶32 The concept of “neutral tools” provides a 
helpful analytical framework for figuring out whether 
a website’s design features materially contribute to the 
unlawfulness of third-party content. A “neutral tool” in 
the CDA context is a feature provided by an interactive 
computer service provider that can “be utilized for proper 
or improper purposes.” Goddard, 640 F. Sup. 2d at 1197 
(citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172). A defendant 
who provides a neutral tool that is subsequently used by 
a third party to create unlawful content will generally 
not be considered to have contributed to the content’s 
unlawfulness. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169. 
See also Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 
589 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“An [interactive computer service 
provider] may not be held liable for so-called ‘neutral 
assistance,’ or tools and functionality that are available 
equally to bad actors and the app’s intended users”) 
(citations omitted).
¶33 Examples of such neutral tools include a blank 
text box for users to describe what they are looking for 
in a roommate, Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173, a 
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rating system that allows consumers to award businesses 
between one and five stars and write reviews, Kimzey 
v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2016), and a 
social media website that allows groups to create profile 
pages and invite members. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 
F.3d at 1358. All of these features can be used for lawful 
purposes, so the CDA immunizes interactive computer 
service providers from liability when these neutral tools 
are used for unlawful purposes. See § 230(c)(1).
¶34 This is true even when an interactive computer 
service provider knows, or should know, that its neutral 
tools are being used for illegal purposes. In Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), for 
example, an actress sued a dating website after a third 
party created a dating profile in her name and posted 
her address. Id. at 1121. She asked the website operator 
to remove the post and the operator initially refused, 
although it was later taken down. Id. at 1122. Despite the 
operator’s awareness of the unlawful content, the operator 
was immune under the CDA because it was not responsible 
for developing the content. Id. at 1125. Instead, it merely 
provided a neutral tool that could be used for lawful or 
unlawful purposes. Id.; see also Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1171 (explaining that in Carafano, “the website 
provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used 
to publish the libel”).
¶35 Finally, the Ninth Circuit clarified in Roommates.
com that the difference between a neutral design feature 
and the development of unlawful content is the potential 
for lawful use. If a dating website had required users to 
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enter their race, sex, and sexual orientation through the 
same drop-down menus as used by Roommates.com, and 
filtered results based on those characteristics, the dating 
website would retain its CDA immunity. Id. at 1169. This is 
because “[i]t is perfectly legal to discriminate along those 
lines in dating.” Id. at 1169 n.23. In contrast, filters based 
on these characteristics have no lawful use in the housing 
context, so they are not “neutral tools” in the housing 
context. Stated otherwise, the filters can be used only for 
unlawful purposes in a housing context. Therefore, if a 
website’s design features can be used for lawful purposes, 
the CDA immunizes the website operator from liability 
when third parties use them for unlawful purposes.
¶36 In this case, Armslist did not develop the 
content of Linn’s firearm advertisement, so Armslist is 
not an information content provider with respect to the 
advertisement.9 Daniel’s argument is based primarily 
on the assertion that Armslist’s design features make 
it easier for prohibited purchasers to illegally obtain 
firearms. She asserts that Armslist should have known, 
actually knew, or even intended that its website would 
facilitate illegal firearm sales to dangerous persons.
¶37 One obvious problem with Daniel’s argument 
is that § 230(c)(1) contains no good faith requirement. 
Therefore, the issue is not whether Armslist knew, or 
should have known, that its site would be used by third 
parties for illegal purposes. Instead, the issue is whether 
9. To the extent Daniel argues that some of her claims are 
not based on the content of the advertisement at all, this argument 
is addressed in Section II. D.
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Armslist was an information content provider with respect 
to Linn’s advertisement. Armslist.com’s provision of an 
advertising forum and the related search functions are all 
“neutral tools” that can be used for lawful purposes. Sales 
of firearms by private sellers are lawful in Wisconsin. 
Further, private sellers in Wisconsin are not required 
to conduct background checks, and private sales are not 
subject to any mandatory waiting period. Accordingly, the 
option to search for offers from private sellers is a tool 
that may be used for lawful purposes.
¶38 The remainder of the design features referenced 
in Daniel’s complaint—lack of a “flag” option for illegal 
activity, failing to require users to create an account, 
failure to create restrictions on who may post or view 
advertisements, and failing to provide sufficient legal 
guidance to sellers—are voluntary precautions that the 
CDA permits but does not require. See, e.g., Cohen v. 
Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(suit against Facebook for failure to adequately screen 
terrorist activity was barred by the CDA); Chi. Lawyers’ 
Comm., 519 F.3d at 670 (explaining that the CDA allows an 
interactive computer service provider to be “indifferent” 
to the content of third-party posts). Whether or not 
Armslist knew illegal content was being posted on its site, 
it did not materially contribute to the content’s illegality.
¶39 Daniel attempts to evade the CDA by asserting 
that creators of armslist.com intended for the website to 
make illegal firearm sales easier. This is an attempt to 
distinguish this case from the litany of cases dismissing 
suits against website operators who failed to screen 
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unlawful content. As the First Circuit has recognized, 
however, the allegation of intent is “a distinction without a 
difference” and does not affect CDA immunity. Backpage.
com, 817 F.3d at 21.
¶40 The Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com explained 
the dangers of allowing allegations of intent or implied 
encouragement to defeat motions to dismiss in CDA cases:
[T]here will always be close cases where a 
clever lawyer could argue that something the 
website operator did encouraged the illegality. 
Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved 
in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart 
out of section 230 by forcing websites to face 
death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off 
claims that they promoted or encouraged—or 
at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of 
third parties. Where it is very clear that the 
website directly participates in developing 
the alleged illegality . . . immunity will be lost. 
But in cases of enhancement by implication or 
development by inference . . . section 230 must 
be interpreted to protect websites not merely 
from ultimate liability, but from having to fight 
costly and protracted legal battles.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174-75. Therefore, allowing 
plaintiffs to escape the CDA by arguing that an interactive 
computer service provider intended its neutral tools to be 
used for unlawful purposes would significantly diminish 
the protections offered by § 230(c)(1).
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¶41 The text and purpose of the CDA require us to 
reject Daniel’s intent argument. Again, § 230(c)(1) contains 
no good faith requirement; we analyze only whether 
Armslist materially contributed to the unlawfulness of 
third-party content such that it “developed” the content 
as provided in § 230(f)(3). Because it did not, it is not an 
information content provider with respect to the content; 
therefore, Daniel’s claims depend on content provided only 
by third parties.
d. treatment as publisher or speaker
¶42 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA prohibits only those 
claims that would treat the interactive computer service 
provider as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party 
content. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 
1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the CDA did not 
bar a plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim against an 
interactive computer service provider who had promised 
to remove unlawful third-party content and then failed 
to do so, as the claim was not based on its publication of 
unlawful content, but on a promise that induced reliance 
and was not kept). If a plaintiff’s claims do not require the 
interactive computer service provider to be treated as a 
publisher or speaker, then the CDA does not immunize 
the interactive computer service provider from suit.
¶43 However, courts do not merely ask whether the 
plaintiff’s complaint calls the defendant a “publisher” or 
“speaker.” “[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause 
of action . . . what matters is whether the cause of action 
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as 
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the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.” 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02. In other words, “courts 
must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the 
defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or 
conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” Id. at 1102. This rule 
prevents plaintiffs from using “artful pleading” to state 
their claims only in terms of the interactive computer 
service provider’s own actions, when the underlying basis 
for liability is unlawful third-party content published by 
the defendant. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Kimzey, 836 
F.3d at 1266 (“[w]e decline to open the door to such artful 
skirting of the CDA’s safe harbor provision.”).
¶44 In Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 
2008), for example, a child was sexually assaulted after 
creating a profile on social media website myspace.com 
and using the site to arrange a meeting with her assailant. 
Id. at 416. The plaintiffs sued Myspace, asserting that 
their claims were not based on Myspace’s publication of 
third-party content, but only on its “failure to implement 
basic safety measures to protect minors.” Id. at 419. The 
Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to artfully 
plead their claims only in terms of Myspace’s own actions: 
“[t]heir allegations are merely another way of claiming that 
MySpace was liable for publishing the communications and 
they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online third-
party-generated content.” Id. at 420. Stated otherwise, 
the duty that MySpace allegedly violated—the duty to 
implement safety measures to protect minors—derived 
from the defendant’s status as the publisher or speaker 
of content provided by another.
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¶45 The First Circuit came to a similar conclusion 
in Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12. Backpage.com was 
a classified advertising website similar to Craigslist, 
allowing third-party users to post goods or services for 
sale in different categories. Id. at 16. Three minors became 
victims of sex trafficking after third parties advertised 
them on backpage.com’s “Adult Entertainment” section. 
Id. at 17. The plaintiffs sued Backpage.com for “a course 
of conduct that allegedly amounts to participation in 
sex trafficking,” in violation of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA). Id. at 18. 
The claims were based on the design features of backpage.
com, such as the lack of phone or email verification, the 
stripping of metadata from uploaded photographs, and 
the failure of the website’s automated filtering system 
to sufficiently block prohibited terms. Id. at 17, 20. The 
plaintiffs attempted to distinguish cases such as Myspace 
by alleging that Backpage.com deliberately designed its 
website to make sex trafficking easier. Backpage.com, 
LLC, 817 F.3d at 17, 21.
¶46 The First Circuit held that the CDA barred the 
plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. Id. at 24. Despite 
the plaintiffs’ efforts to plead their claims only in terms 
of Backpage.com’s acts, third-party content was “an 
essential component of each and all of the appellants’ 
TVPRA claims.” Id. at 22. In other words, the duty 
Backpage.com allegedly violated derived from its role as a 
publisher. It did not affect the First Circuit’s analysis that 
Backpage.com was alleged to have deliberately designed 
its website to facilitate sex trafficking. As mentioned 
earlier, § 230(c)(1) contains no good faith requirement, so 
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“[s]howing that a website operates through a meretricious 
business model is not enough to strip away [the CDA’s] 
protections.” Id. at 29.
¶47 The court of appeals relied heavily on J.S. v. Vill. 
Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., 184 Wn.2d 95, 359 P.3d 
714 (Wash. 2015). In J.S., which involved claims against 
the operator of backpage.com on substantially the same 
facts as in Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, the 
plaintiffs made the same argument as the Jane Doe No. 
1 plaintiffs, asserting that backpage.com was deliberately 
designed to facilitate sex trafficking. The Washington 
Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegation of 
intent was enough to escape the reach of the CDA. J.S., 
359 P.3d at 718.
¶48 J.S. is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 
Washington’s pleading standard is much different than 
Wisconsin’s. Under Washington law, a complaint may be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim “only if it appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would 
justify recovery.” Id. at 716 (citation omitted). Washington 
courts may consider “hypothetical facts” that were not 
pled. Therefore, a complaint may not be dismissed “if 
any set of facts could exist that would justify recovery,” 
whether such facts were pled in the complaint or not. 
Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 755 P.2d 781, 785 (Wash. 
1988). For this reason, Washington courts may grant 
motions to dismiss “only in the unusual case in which 
plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the 
complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.” 
J.S., 359 P.3d at 716. This pleading standard is inconsistent 
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with Wisconsin’s pleading standard. See Data Key 
Partners, 356 Wis. 2d. 665, ¶21 (“a complaint must plead 
facts, which if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”).
¶49 More importantly, the Washington Supreme 
Court ignored the text of the CDA, and the overwhelming 
majority of cases interpreting it, by inserting an intent 
exception into § 230(c)(1). The Washington Supreme 
Court opined that “[i]t is important to ascertain whether 
in fact Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex 
trafficking . . . because ‘a website helps to develop unlawful 
content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, 
if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct.’” J.S., 359 P.3d at 718 (citing Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1168). Underlying this statement is the implicit 
assumption that a website operator’s subjective knowledge 
or intent may transform what would otherwise be a neutral 
tool into a “material contribution” to the unlawfulness 
of third-party content. As explained in Section II. C., 
however, this assumption has no basis in the text of § 230(c)
(1). The relevant inquiry, regardless of foreseeability or 
intent, is “whether the cause of action necessarily requires 
that the defendant be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of content provided by another.” Backpage.com, LLC, 817 
F.3d at 19 (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02).
¶50 In this case, all of Daniel’s claims against Armslist 
require the court to treat Armslist as the publisher or 
speaker of third-party content. Daniel’s negligence claim 
asserts that Armslist had a duty to exercise “reasonable 
care” in “facilitating” the sale of guns, and had a duty to 
employ “sufficient questioning and screening” to reduce 
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the risk of foreseeable injury to others. The complaint 
alleges that Armslist breached this duty by designing 
armslist.com to “facilitate” illegal gun sales, as well as by 
failing to implement sufficient safety measures to prevent 
the unlawful use of its website.
¶51 Daniel’s negligence claim is simply another way 
of claiming that Armslist is liable for publishing third-
party firearm advertisements and for failing to properly 
screen who may access this content. The complaint alleges 
that Armslist breached its duty of care by designing a 
website that could be used to facilitate illegal sales, failing 
to provide proper legal guidance to users, and failing to 
adequately screen unlawful content. Restated, it alleges 
that Armslist provided an online forum for third-party 
content and failed to adequately monitor that content. 
The duty Armslist is alleged to have violated derives from 
its role as a publisher of firearm advertisements. This is 
precisely the type of claim that is prohibited by § 230(c)
(1), no matter how artfully pled.
¶52 That Armslist may have known that its site could 
facilitate illegal gun sales does not change the result. 
Because § 230(c)(1) contains no good faith requirement, 
courts do not allow allegations of intent or knowledge to 
defeat a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1174-75. Regardless of Armslist’s knowledge 
or intent, the relevant question is whether Daniel’s 
claim necessarily requires Armslist to be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of third-party content. Because it 
does, the negligence claim must be dismissed.
Appendix A
29a
¶53 The negligence per se claim is dismissed for 
the same reason. Daniel alleges that Armslist “violated 
federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, and 
ordinances” by facilitating Haughton’s purchase of a 
firearm. It is true that in Wisconsin, “‘one who violates a 
criminal statute must be held negligent per se in a civil 
action for damages based on such violation.’” Bennett 
v. Larsen Co., 118 Wis. 2d 681, 692-93, 348 N.W.2d 540 
(1984). As with the negligence claim, however, Daniel’s 
only basis for alleging that Armslist violated any statute, 
regulation, or ordinance requires Armslist to be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of Linn’s post.
¶54 Similarly, the aiding and abetting tortious 
conduct claim asserts that Armslist “aided, abetted, 
encouraged, urged, and acquiesced in” Linn’s illegal sale 
to Radcliffe by “brokering” the transaction. However, 
there is no allegation that Armslist’s participation in 
the transaction went beyond creating a forum for Linn’s 
advertisement and failing to prohibit Radcliffe from 
viewing the advertisement. This claim would therefore 
require Armslist to be treated as the publisher of the 
advertisement and must be dismissed.
¶55 The public nuisance claim is dismissed for the 
same reason. Daniel asserts that Armslist “negligently, 
recklessly, and/or intentionally facilitate[ed] the sale 
of vast quantities of guns” to prohibited purchasers, 
resulting in a “substantial and unreasonable interference 
with the public’s health, safety, convenience, comfort, 
peace, and use of public property and/or private property.” 
The act or omission alleged to have created the nuisance 
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is Armslist’s provision of a forum for third parties to post 
and view firearms advertisements. In other words, the 
duty Armslist is alleged to have violated derives from its 
role as a publisher of third-party content. Accordingly, 
the public nuisance claim is dismissed.
¶56 Daniel’s civil conspiracy claim does not allege 
that Armslist conspired with Linn to sell a firearm to 
a known prohibited purchaser; rather, it alleges that 
Armslist, LLC’s members conspired with one another 
to create a marketplace for illegal firearm sales, and 
“advised, encouraged, or assisted” Armslist, LLC in 
facilitating unlawful firearm sales. Again, the complaint 
does not allege that Armslist’s role in facilitating these 
illegal transactions went beyond creating a forum on which 
third parties could post and view firearm advertisements. 
As with the claims discussed above, the civil conspiracy 
claim is another way of stating that Armslist is liable for 
publishing third-party content. The civil conspiracy claim 
is therefore dismissed.
¶57 All of Daniel’s remaining claims—negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death and 
piercing the corporate veil—are dependent on the claims 
we have discussed above. Because all of those claims have 
been dismissed, Daniel’s claims for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, wrongful death and piercing the 
corporate veil are dismissed as well. Accordingly, the 
circuit court did not err when it granted Armslist’s motion 
to dismiss
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iii. conclUsion
¶58 We conclude that 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) requires 
us to dismiss Daniel’s complaint against Armslist. 
Section 230(c)(1) prohibits claims that treat Armslist, an 
interactive computer service provider, as the publisher 
or speaker of information posted by a third party on its 
website. Because all of Daniel’s claims for relief require 
Armslist to be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
information posted by third parties on armslist.com, her 
claims are barred by § 230(c)(1). Accordingly, we reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the circuit 
court’s dismissal of Daniel’s complaint.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals 
is reversed.
¶59 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from 
participation before oral argument.
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¶60 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The 
majority views Daniel’s complaint as merely “artful 
pleading,” disguising her true claims against Armslist. By 
using the phrase “artful pleading,” the majority implicitly 
acknowledges that the language of the complaint states 
a claim. In essence, it posits, “I know that’s what it says, 
but that’s not what it really means.”
¶61 What the majority would call “artful pleading,” I 
would instead call the plain language of the complaint—
which at this stage of the proceedings, the law mandates 
we accept as true.1
¶62 The complaint alleges that Zina Daniel Haughton 
sought and received a restraining order against her 
husband, Radcliffe Haughton, after he assaulted her and 
threatened her life. Majority op., ¶3. Pursuant to the 
restraining order, Radcliffe was prohibited from owning 
a firearm for a period of four years. Id.; see Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m)(f).2
1. For purposes of our review, we must accept the allegations 
of Daniel’s complaint as true. PRN Assocs. LLC v. State, DOA, 
2009 WI 53, ¶27, 317 Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559; see Meyers v. 
Bayer AG, Bayer Corp., 2007 WI 99, ¶81, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 735 
N.W.2d 448 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
2. Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(f) provides that a person who 
possesses a firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if “[t]he person is 
subject to an injunction issued under s. 813.12 or 813.122 . . . that 
includes notice to the respondent that he or she is subject to the 
requirements and penalties under this section and that has been 
filed under s. 813.128(3g).”
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¶63 Within two days Radcliffe had a gun in his hands. 
See Majority op., ¶3. And within three days, Radcliffe 
went to Zina’s place of employment, and in front of her 
daughter, shot and killed Zina. He also murdered two 
other people, injured four others, and then shot and killed 
himself. Id., ¶4.
¶64 Radcliffe quickly and easily, without undergoing 
the inconvenience of a federal background check, procured 
a gun using a website designed by Armslist. The complaint 
avers that Armslist designed its website with the specific 
purpose of skirting federal gun laws.
¶65 Nevertheless, the majority allows Armslist to hide 
behind the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which 
affords immunity to websites if a plaintiff’s claims treat 
the website “as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The allegations here, however, assert 
liability for Armslist not based on content provided by 
another. Rather, the allegations assert liability based on 
design content Armslist alone created.
¶66 In my view, the majority errs in its interpretation 
of the CDA by basing its decision not on the actual claims 
pled in the complaint but on its own manufactured 
interpretation of those claims. As a result, it fails to 
recognize that here the design itself is the creation of 
content.3 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
3. Examples of design content are ubiquitous. One need look 
no further than the design content of algorithms, used to influence 
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¶67 The complaint alleges that Radcliffe was hastily 
able to procure this gun by using Armslist.com, a website 
that serves as an online marketplace for firearms. 
Majority op., ¶¶1, 3. He focused his search for a gun 
exclusively on Armslist “because he knew that he could 
not acquire a firearm from a licensed dealer or from a 
private seller in his community who knew him, and that 
any contact with a legitimate seller could result in his 
plan of illegally purchasing a firearm being revealed to 
law enforcement authorities.”
¶68 Importantly, unlicensed private sellers are 
not required under federal law to conduct background 
checks on individuals attempting to purchase firearms. 
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(t); 18 U.S.C. § 923(a). Allowing and 
encouraging prohibited purchasers like Radcliffe to 
circumvent the laws governing licensed firearm dealers, 
Armslist incorporated a search function that allows 
potential gun buyers to exclude licensed dealers from 
their queries.
¶69 The day after the issuance of the restraining 
order against him, Radcliffe took action to accomplish his 
goal. After seeing on Armslist an advertisement for an 
FNP-40 semiautomatic handgun and three high-capacity 
magazines of ammunition, Radcliffe contacted the seller of 
everything from where we shop to the sentencing of criminals. See 
State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749. The 
parameters of “content” extend beyond simply words on a page.
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the items, Devin Linn, using Armslist’s “contact” function. 
The gun was listed for $500, a cost higher than what would 
have been paid by a legitimate buyer for the same weapon 
and ammunition. Radcliffe advised Linn in a phone call 
that “he needed the firearm as soon as possible.”
¶70 Consistent with Radcliffe’s desire for a fast 
transaction, he and Linn met the following morning. 
Linn handed over the gun and ammunition, no questions 
asked. Despite erratic behavior on Radcliffe’s part, Linn 
sold Radcliffe the weapon without determining whether 
he was a felon, whether he was subject to a restraining 
order or whether he had been adjudicated mentally ill. He 
made no inquiry whatsoever.
¶71 After Radcliffe took the weapon he purchased 
from Linn and used it to kill Zina and two other people, 
Zina’s daughter Yasmeen Daniel brought this lawsuit. 
The theory of liability advanced focused on Armslist’s 
conduct: “the Armslist Defendants designed Armslist.
com specifically to exploit and profit from the background 
check exception for private sellers, to enable the sale of 
firearms to prohibited and otherwise dangerous people, 
and to enable illegal firearm sales, including sales that 
avoid federal restrictions on interstate transfers, state-
imposed waiting periods, and state-specific assault 
weapon restrictions.”
¶72 Daniel further alleged that “[t]he Armslist 
Defendants knew, or should have known, that the design 
and architecture of Armslist.com creates a near-certainty 
that prohibited purchasers will use the marketplace to buy 
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firearms, and that the marketplace will be used for illegal 
gun sales, including by unlicensed individuals that are 
engaged in the business of selling firearms.” In Daniel’s 
estimation, Armslist breached its duty to the public by 
“[d]esigning Armslist.com to facilitate sales to prohibited 
purchasers, such as Radcliffe Haughton.”
¶73 Armslist moved to dismiss the claims against it 
based on CDA immunity. The circuit court granted the 
motion to dismiss and the court of appeals unanimously 
reversed.
¶74 Now reversing the court of appeals, the majority 
determines that Armslist is immune from Daniel’s claims 
pursuant to the CDA. Majority op., ¶2. In the majority’s 
view, “all of Daniel’s claims for relief require Armslist 
to be treated as the publisher or speaker of information 
posted by third parties . . . ,” entitling it to CDA immunity. 
Id. It further opines that “Daniel’s negligence claim is 
simply another way of claiming that Armslist is liable for 
publishing third-party firearm advertisements and for 
failing to properly screen who may access this content.” 
Id., ¶51.
ii
¶75 This case presents a discrete question of statutory 
interpretation. As the court of appeals in this case 
correctly stated, “[t]he sole and limited issue is whether 
the complaint seeks to hold Armslist liable on a basis 
prohibited by the Act.” Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 2018 WI 
App 32, ¶28, 382 Wis. 2d 241, 913 N.W.2d 211.
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¶76 The statute at issue is the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
(1), which provides: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”
¶77 Another nearby provision states the preemptive 
effect of the CDA: “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State 
law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). The CDA is a purveyor of immunity, but 
it “was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the 
Internet.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
¶78 Our inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff’s 
theory of liability (that Armslist designed its website to 
facilitate illegal gun purchases) treats Armslist as the 
speaker or publisher of Linn’s and Radcliffe’s posted 
advertisements. The court of appeals, subscribing to a 
plain language interpretation of the CDA, concluded that 
“Congress limited immunity to a single circumstance: 
when a theory of liability treats the website creator or 
operator ‘as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.’ 
Nothing in this language speaks more generally to website 
design and operation.” Daniel, 382 Wis. 2d 241, ¶42.
¶79 In the court of appeals’ view, the content for which 
Daniel seeks liability “is not ‘information provided by 
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another information content provider.’ Rather, it is content 
created by Armslist, and there is no language in the Act 
immunizing Armslist from liability based on content that 
it creates.” Id., ¶44.
¶80 I agree with the court of appeals’ unanimous 
determination. A close reading of Daniel’s complaint 
indicates that the complaint is not seeking to hold Armslist 
liable for any content created by a third party. The 
complaint does not allege that Armslist is liable due to the 
advertisements posted by Radcliffe and Linn. Instead, it 
alleges that Armslist is liable for its own content, i.e. the 
design and search functionality of its website.
¶81 “Where it is very clear that the website directly 
participates in developing the alleged illegality . . . 
immunity will be lost.” Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 
1174. Such is the allegation here.
¶82 As the court of appeals observed, this conclusion 
is supported by the Washington Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the CDA in J.S. v. Village Voice Media 
Holdings, LLC, 184 Wn.2d 95, 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015). 
In J.S., a victim of sex trafficking filed suit against 
Backpage, a website that allowed hosted advertisements 
offering sexual services. Id., ¶¶2-3. She alleged that the 
website “is not immune from suit in part because its 
advertisement posting rules were ‘designed to help pimps 
develop advertisements that can evade the unwanted 
attention of law enforcement, while still conveying the 
illegal message.” Id., ¶3.
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¶83 The J.S. court observed that its determination 
“turns on whether Backpage merely hosted the 
advertisements that featured J.S., in which case Backpage 
is protected by CDA immunity, or whether Backpage also 
helped develop the content of those advertisements, in 
which case Backpage is not protected by CDA immunity.” 
Id., ¶11. Backpage moved to dismiss, claiming CDA 
immunity, but the court allowed J.S.’s claims to proceed.
¶84 In doing so, the J.S. court examined the allegations 
of the complaint, and taking them as true, determined 
that they “would show Backpage did more than simply 
maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain 
content.” Id., ¶12.4 Following the same mode of analysis 
here, Armslist is not entitled to CDA immunity.
4. The majority’s attempt to distinguish and dismiss J.S. is 
unpersuasive. See majority op., ¶¶48-49. First, the majority fails 
to explain how using Wisconsin’s pleading standard instead of 
Washington’s would change the result. Contrary to the majority’s 
assertion, the J.S. court did not base its determination on any 
“hypothetical facts.” Rather, it took the allegations of the complaint 
as true, just as we do in Wisconsin. See J.S. v. Village Voice Media 
Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, ¶12 (Wash. 2015) (“Viewing J.S.’s 
allegations in the light most favorable to J.S., as we must at this 
stage, J.S. alleged facts that, if proved true . . . “); Data Key 
Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶18, 356 Wis. 2d 
665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (“When we review a motion to dismiss, factual 
allegations in the complaint are accepted as true for purposes of 
our review.”).
Second, the J.S. court did not establish an “intent exception” 
to CDA immunity as the majority claims, but merely recognized 
a distinction that is manifest in the CDA’s text: the distinction 
between first-party created content and third-party created 
content. See majority op., ¶49.
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¶85 Specifically, Daniel alleges in her complaint that 
“[o]ne of the most prominent features of Armslist’s search 
function is the ability to search for only private sellers, 
thereby eliminating from search results any sellers 
required to perform a background check.” No one but 
Armslist is alleged to be responsible for this feature.
¶86 Daniel further asserts that this feature was 
intentionally created “specifically to exploit and profit 
from the background check exception for private sellers, 
to enable the sale of firearms to prohibited and otherwise 
dangerous people, and to enable illegal firearm sales, 
including sales that avoid federal restrictions on interstate 
transfers, state-imposed waiting periods, and state-
specific assault weapon restrictions.” Again, no one but 
Armslist is alleged to be responsible for this design.5
5. Justice Wiggins’s concurrence in J.S. is particularly 
insightful in examining the facts alleged in Daniel’s complaint in 
this case. Narrowly interpreting the CDA, Justice Wiggins wrote:
Plaintiffs do not argue that Backpage.com necessarily 
induces the posting of unlawful content by merely 
providing an escort services category. Instead, 
plaintiffs allege that Backpage.com deliberately 
designed its posting rules in a manner that would 
enable pimps to engage in sex trafficking, including 
in the traff icking of minors, and to avoid law 
enforcement. These factual allegations do not suggest 
that Backpage.com is being treated as a “publisher 
or speaker.”
J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, 359 P.3d 714, ¶30 (Wash. 
2015) (Wiggins, J., concurring); see also Mary Graw Leary, The 
Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 41 Harv. J. of Law & Pub. Pol’y 553, 587-591 (2018).
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¶87 The majority contends that “all of Daniel’s claims 
for relief require Armslist to be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of information posted by third parties . . . .” 
Majority op., ¶2. Further, the majority claims that its 
decision “prevents plaintiffs from using ‘artful pleading’ to 
state their claims only in terms of the interactive computer 
service provider’s own actions, when the underlying basis 
for liability is unlawful third-party content published by 
the defendant.” Majority op., ¶43.
¶88 But the majority’s approach requires the court 
to ignore the literal words used in the complaint. In its 
endeavor to brand Daniel’s complaint as “artful pleading,” 
it ties itself in knots to avoid the actual claims Daniel 
makes.
¶89 Such an approach deviates from established 
practice that plaintiffs are the masters of their complaints. 
See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99, 
107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). Rather than 
applying the complaint’s plain language, the majority 
manufactures an interpretation. Embarking upon a legally 
unsupportable approach, it fails to recognize that here 
the design itself is content and ignores the distinction 
between first-party created content and third-party 
created content.
¶90 The complaint sets forth that Daniel is seeking 
liability against Armslist for Armslist’s conduct only. We 
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should take the complaint at face value.6 Accordingly, 
Armslist is not entitled to CDA immunity.
¶91 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
6. Further, I observe that my conclusion is not at odds with 
the bulk of CDA jurisprudence. For example, in Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), a seminal CDA case, 
the Fourth Circuit determined that “§ 230 precludes courts from 
entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider 
in a publisher’s role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone or alter content—are barred.”
Zeran and its progeny are not disturbed by my conclusion. 
My analysis and Zeran peacefully coexist because they deal with 
different factual allegations—liability for third party content vs. 
liability for first party content.
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APPENDIX B — DECISION OF THE COURT 
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COURT OF APPEALS OF  
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
Appeal No. 2017AP344
Cir. Ct. No. 2015CV8710
YASMEEN DANIEL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
ZINA DANIEL HAUGHTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF 
CONNECTICUT, AS SUBROGEE  
FOR JALISCO’S LLC, 
Intervening Plaintiff, 
v. 
ARMSLIST, LLC, AN OKLAHOMA LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY, BRIAN MANCINI  
AND JONATHAN GIBBON, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
BROC ELMORE, ABC INSURANCE CO., THE 
FICTITIOUS NAME FOR AN UNKNOWN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, DEF INSURANCE CO., 
THE FICTITIOUS NAME FOR AN UNKNOWN 
INSURANCE COMPANY AND ESTATE OF 
RADCLIFFE HAUGHTON, BY HIS SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR JENNIFER VALENTI, 
Defendants, 
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PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL  
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Intervening Defendant.
November 13, 2017, Submitted on Briefs;  
April 19, 2018, Decided;  
April 19, 2018, Filed
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County: GLENN H. YAMAHIRO, Judge. 
Reversed.
Before Lundsten, P.J., Blanchard, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.
¶1 BLANCHARD, J. This is a tort action arising 
from a mass casualty shooting at a salon in Brookfield, 
Wisconsin. It is alleged that the shooter, Radcliffe 
Haughton, bought the firearm and ammunition he used 
in the shooting after responding to a “for sale” post that 
appeared on a website, Armslist.com. Yasmeen Daniel, 
the daughter of shooting victim Zina Daniel Haughton 
and the administrator of her mother’s estate, has filed 
multiple tort claims against Armslist, LLC, which created 
and operated Armslist.com.1 Significant to Daniel’s claims, 
1. Yasmeen Daniel brought this action both individually and as 
administrator of the estate of Zina Daniel Haughton. We refer to her 
in both capacities as “Daniel.” Daniel also brought claims against 
Radcliffe’s estate and the person who sold the gun and ammunition 
to Radcliffe. We do not address those claims in this appeal.
Separately, we note that Daniel has also sued two members of 
Armslist, LLC. We will refer to the LLC and its two members as 
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when Radcliffe purchased the firearm and ammunition, 
he was prohibited by a state court domestic violence 
injunction from possessing a firearm.2
¶2 The circuit court dismissed Daniel’s complaint 
against Armslist in its entirety, based on the federal 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“the Act”). See 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) and (e)(3) (October, 1998). As pertinent 
here, the Act creates what Armslist argues is immunity 
from any “liability” that “may be imposed under any State 
or local law” for a “provider” of “an interactive computer 
service” under a theory of liability that “treat[s]” the 
provider “as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” See id. 
The court concluded that Armslist has immunity under 
this provision of the Act because Daniel alleges only that 
Armslist “passively displays content that [was] created 
entirely by third parties” and “simply maintain[ed] neutral 
policies prohibiting or eliminating certain content,” and 
because Daniel “fails to allege facts which establish ... 
that Armslist [was] materially engaged in creating or 
developing the illegal content on its page.”
¶3 We reverse the order dismissing the complaint as 
to the Armslist defendants. Applying a plain language 
“Armslist” or the “Armslist defendants.” For purposes of this appeal 
neither side suggests that there is any potential difference in liability 
among Armslist defendants, and we generally treat them in an 
identical manner. Our decision reversing dismissal of the complaint 
applies to all Armslist defendants.
2. We refer to Radcliffe and Zina by their first names because 
they shared a last name.
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interpretation to the Act, we agree with Daniel that the 
allegations in the complaint, which are that Armslist 
used website design features to facilitate illegal firearms 
purchases, do not seek to hold Armslist liable on a theory 
prohibited by the Act. Stated in the terms used in the 
Act, we conclude that the allegations do not seek to hold 
Armslist liable under a theory of liability that “treat[s]” 
Armslist “as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider,” which 
is the protection at issue here that the Act provides. We 
reject Armslist’s argument because the Act provides 
immunity to website operators, such as Armslist, only 
when the allegations treat the website as the publisher 
or speaker of third-party content, and the Act does not 
protect a website operator from liability that arises from 
its own conduct in facilitating user activity, as is the case 
here.
¶4 There is a separate issue, which does not involve 
immunity under the Act, namely, the court’s dismissal of 
a claim of negligence per se. On this issue, we agree with 
Daniel that, as Armslist effectively concedes, the circuit 
court erred in dismissing this claim.
¶5 Accordingly, we reverse dismissal of the complaint 
as to the Armslist defendants, including the dismissal of 
the negligence per se claim, and remand.
BACKGROUND
¶6 The following are facts that are alleged or which 
reasonably can be inferred from the complaint in favor of 
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Daniel. As discussed below, we must accept the facts and 
reasonable inferences as true for purposes of this appeal.
Allegations Relating To Firearms Sales In General
¶7 Federally licensed firearms dealers are required 
to access and consider certain background information 
regarding potential buyers in order to prevent sales to 
individuals prohibited by law from possessing firearms. 
See Wis. stat. § 175.35(2) (2015-16); 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).3 
It is unlawful to sell a firearm to certain persons, including 
those who have domestic abuse injunctions entered against 
them. See Wis. stat. § 941.29(4); 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). We 
will sometimes refer to firearms sales to persons who are 
legally prohibited from possessing them as “prohibited 
sales,” and to the purchasers as “prohibited purchasers.”
¶8 In contrast to federally licensed dealers, unlicensed 
“private sellers”—meaning persons not “engaged in the 
business of selling firearms”—are not required under 
federal law to conduct background checks. We follow the 
lead of the parties here, consistent with many authorities, 
in using the phrases “private sellers” and “private sales” 
to refer to firearms sales by persons who are not engaged 
in the business of selling firearms and not licensed by the 
federal government as firearms dealers. Private sales are 
attractive to potential buyers who fear that they will fail 
a background check.
3. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 
version unless otherwise noted. All references to the United States 
Code are to the current version unless otherwise noted.
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¶9 To summarize the basics of the allegations, then, 
private sales without background checks are not per se 
unlawful but are attractive to prohibited persons, and 
prohibited persons violate the law by obtaining firearms 
from anyone.
¶10 The complaint further alleges that statistics 
show that firearms sold through private sales are more 
frequently transferred to prohibited persons than 
are firearms transferred in federally licensed sales. 
Specifically, the complaint alleges that published studies 
prove that private sellers and prohibited purchasers are 
attracted to use Armslist.com by its permitted anonymity 
and its various filtering features, which make it easier for 
buyers to avoid having to submit to a background check 
and to minimize the collection of evidence that could be 
used to hold them accountable for later unlawful acts 
committed with an identified firearm.
¶11 In addition, the complaint alleges that private 
sales facilitated by online communications have been 
linked to illegal firearms trafficking, to firearms sales to 
minors, and to mass casualty shootings. As a result, the 
complaint alleges, major classified advertising websites, 
such as eBay, Craigslist, and Amazon.com, prohibit posts 
seeking to buy or sell firearms.
Allegations Relating To The Armslist.com Website
¶12 After several major websites prohibited users from 
using posts to facilitate firearms transactions, Armslist 
saw a commercial opening in this area and created 
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Armslist.com. Through the website, potential buyers and 
sellers contacted one another, either by clicking on a link 
within the website or by using the contact information 
provided by the other party through the website.
¶13 The complaint alleges that design and operational 
features of Armslist.com, which we now summarize, 
aff irmatively “encouraged” transactions in which 
prohibited purchasers acquired firearms:
• Made private sales easy; ability to limit 
searches. Sellers could indicate on the 
website whether they were “premium 
vendors” (i.e., federally licensed firearms 
dealers) or instead “private sellers.” 
Potential buyers were allowed to identify 
preferences for private sellers and to limit 
their search results to private sellers.
• No f lagging of “criminal” or “illegal” 
content. Users were allowed to “flag” ads 
to invite “review and policing” by Armslist, 
and Armslist used these “flags” to delete 
certain posts and to prohibit certain users 
from posting on Armslist.com. However, 
the website expressly prevented users from 
flagging content as purportedly criminal or 
illegal.
• Warning against illegality, but no specific 
legal guidance. Armslist.com contained a 
warning that users must obey the law and 
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asked users to certify that they would not 
use the website for “any illegal purpose.” 
However, it provided no guidance on specific 
laws governing firearm sales or the care 
that should be used in conducting such sales.
• No registration requirement; flagging of 
registered accounts. Users were not required 
to “register” an account with Armslist.com, 
“thereby encouraging anonymity.” Armslist 
prominently displayed a statement on each 
post indicating whether the poster had a 
“registered” or “unregistered” account.
• No buyer restrictions; no waiting period 
for private sales. “Armslist does not contain 
any restrictions for prospective buyers, and 
its website is designed to enable buyers 
to evade state waiting period and other 
legal requirements.” This “waiting period” 
reference is based on a Wisconsin law, in 
place at the time of the Linn-Radcliffe 
transaction, that required federally licensed 
firearms dealers to wait 48 hours after 
receiving a “proceed” response from 
the background check system before 
transferring the firearm, while private sales 
were not subject to this requirement.
¶14 In contrast, the complaint alleges, a different 
website for firearms transactions requires its users to 
register before buying a firearm and to take delivery 
Appendix B
51a
only through a licensed dealer, which greatly minimizes 
the chances of firearms transfers to prohibited persons.
¶15 The complaint includes the allegation that “the 
average number of want ads specifically asking to buy from 
a private seller on Armslist[.com] is 240% higher in states 
that do not require background checks on those sales as 
compared to states that require [background] checks 
on private, stranger-to-stranger sales.” In particular 
Wisconsin, which did not require a background check for 
a private sale, “had the fifth highest number of Armslist 
[.com] want ads seeking to buy from private sellers.”
¶16 The complaint cites a report that allegedly 
concludes that 54 percent of Armslist.com users selling 
firearms are willing to sell to a person they believe could 
not pass a background check, and 67 percent of private 
online sellers in Wisconsin are willing to sell to a person 
they believe could not pass a background check.
¶17 In sum, Daniel’s theory of liability is that, through 
its design and operation of website features, Armslist’s 
actions were a cause of the injuries to Daniel.
Allegations Relating To The Firearm Sale To Radcliffe
¶18 The complaint alleges that police arrested 
Radcliffe after he assaulted Zina in their home, then 
confronted her with a knife in the parking lot of the salon 
where she worked, and slashed the tires of her car. Zina 
successfully sought an injunction from a circuit court 
that prohibited Radcliffe from contacting Zina and from 
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possessing a firearm for four years. This made Radcliffe 
a prohibited person under state and federal law. See Wis. 
stat. § 941.29(1m)(f); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).
¶19 Thereafter, Radcliffe searched for a firearm 
to buy, exclusively using Armslist.com. Radcliffe used 
an Armslist.com function that allowed him to exclude 
licensed dealers in his search. Radcliffe found a post by 
private seller Devin Linn that offered a semiautomatic 
handgun and three high-capacity magazines for sale. 
Radcliffe arranged, through communications with Linn 
on the website, to buy the firearm and ammunition in an 
all-cash transaction with Linn in a fast food restaurant 
parking lot. The next day, Radcliffe used this firearm and 
ammunition to fatally shoot four people, including Zina 
and himself, and to wound four others.
¶20 Daniel alleges multiple state law causes of action 
against the Armslist defendants, each arising from the 
allegations summarized above.4 The circuit court granted 
4. Briefly in the text and in the second paragraph of this 
footnote we address two specific claims. We address a negligence per 
se claim later in the text and we address a claim based on alter-ego 
liability in the next paragraph of this footnote. Otherwise, however, 
we need not separately address the tort claims in Daniel’s complaint, 
because Armslist does not argue that we should distinguish among 
the claims in resolving the primary issue involving potential 
immunity under the Act.
Regarding Daniel’s request to pierce the corporate veil of 
Armslist, LLC, through a claim based on alter-ego liability, we 
interpret the circuit court to have responded to Armslist’s request to 
dismiss this claim by indicating that the request was premature. The 
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a motion to dismiss filed by the Armslist defendants on 
the ground that the Act bars Daniel’s claims against 
the Armslist defendants. Separately, the circuit court 
dismissed the negligence per se claim based on a 1979 
decision of this court. Daniel appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶21 The primary issue presented is whether Daniel’s 
claims fail on Armslist’s motion to dismiss because the 
Armslist defendants are immune from liability for state 
law claims under the federal Communications Decency 
Act. Before addressing the primary issue, we briefly 
address a separate circuit court decision, namely, to 
dismiss one cause of action, negligence per se, which we 
conclude was an error resulting from a misapplication of 
case law. See State v. Walker, 2008 WI 34, ¶13, 308 Wis. 
court noted that there could be no grounds to pierce the corporate 
veil before Daniel first obtains a judgment against Armslist, LLC, in 
this case, which may not come to pass. At least based on the limited 
briefing with which we have been provided, this issue does not appear 
ripe, and we do not address this topic further.
One additional note on the status of claims and parties. Our 
holding that there is no immunity under the Act based on the 
allegations in the complaint reverses the circuit court’s ruling, if 
it was intended as such, that individual defendants Mancini and 
Gibbon must be dismissed from the complaint. However, we interpret 
the court to have stated only that the individual defendants should 
be dismissed for the same reason that the complaint should be 
dismissed, based on immunity under the Act, and Armslist takes 
a position consistent with this interpretation. Because we hold that 
the Act does not apply, Mancini and Gibbon remain in the case at 
this juncture.
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2d 666, 747 N.W.2d 673 (applications of case law present 
questions of law that are reviewed de novo on appeal).
¶22 The circuit court applied a 1979 decision of this 
court to dismiss the negligence per se claim. That case, 
Olson v. Ratzel, 89 Wis. 2d 227, 238, 244-250, 278 N.W.2d 
238 (Ct. App. 1979), arguably supports the circuit court’s 
decision, because it explains that, while the general rule 
is that a violation of a criminal statute is negligence per 
se, various factors created reasonable doubt that criminal 
statutes involving firearms handling or possession 
could constitute negligence per se. Regardless whether 
Olson supports the circuit court’s decision, Daniel 
correctly points out that the portion of the opinion that 
the circuit court relied on is no longer the law, if it ever 
was. Our supreme court, in 1951 and again in 1984, has 
stated unambiguously that the following is the “rule” in 
Wisconsin: “‘one who violates a criminal statute must be 
held negligent per se in a civil action for damages based on 
such violation.’” See Bennett v. Larsen Co., 118 Wis. 2d 681, 
692-93, 348 N.W.2d 540 (1984) (quoting McAleavy v. Lowe, 
259 Wis. 463, 475, 49 N.W.2d 487 (1951)). Discussion in 
both McAleavy and Bennett leave no doubt that the court, 
in each opinion, intended to adopt this broad unqualified 
rule. And, as Daniel also points out, when a decision of 
this court conflicts with a decision of the supreme court, 
the latter controls. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 
189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). Moreover, Armslist does not 
address this Bennett-based argument in its response brief, 
effectively conceding the point. Accordingly, we reverse 
the circuit court’s decision dismissing the negligence per 
se claim.
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¶23 We now turn to the primary issue, immunity 
under the Act.
Legal Standards
¶24 A complaint “fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted if the defendant is immune from 
liability for the activity alleged in the complaint.” See 
Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire Cty., 152 Wis. 
2d 453, 463, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989) (citation omitted).5 
Preemption of state law tort liability under the Act can 
“support a motion to dismiss if the statute’s barrier to 
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.” Ricci v. 
Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015).
¶25 Our standard of review and the substantive 
standard for consideration of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted 
are well established:
Whether a complaint states a claim upon which 
relief can be granted is a question of law for our 
independent review; ....
5. At least one court has questioned whether it is appropriate 
to use the term “immunity” in connection with the Act. See Chicago 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2008). But Armslist has raised the 
affirmative defense of “immunity” in support of its motion to dismiss, 
and both parties on appeal use the term without qualification. We 
see no problem in using the term “immunity” to describe the result 
that Armslist seeks under the Act, so long as the term is correctly 
limited to the narrow scope of immunity dictated by the language 
of the Act.
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When we review a motion to dismiss, factual 
allegations in the complaint are accepted as 
true for purposes of our review....
....
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” 
Upon a motion to dismiss, we accept as true 
all facts well-pleaded in the complaint and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom. 
Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 
86, ¶¶17-19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693 (citations 
omitted). Thus, here we must accept all allegations of the 
complaint as true, and we look to the face of the complaint 
to determine whether a motion to dismiss is warranted 
based on the pertinent provisions of the Act.
¶26 “[S]tatutory interpretation ‘begins with the 
language of the statute.’” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted). “If the meaning 
of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.” Id. 
We interpret a statute “in the context in which it is used; 
not in isolation but as part of a whole.” Id., ¶46.
Analysis
¶27 We begin with two general observations. First, 
our task has been complicated, as we think was also the 
case for the circuit court, by the fact that the parties fail to 
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provide us with developed arguments directly addressing 
the language of the Act. While both sides reference 
statutory language and Daniel makes brief attempts to 
analyze it, both sides primarily base their arguments on 
their interpretations of case law from other jurisdictions 
addressing the Act. Because this case presents an issue 
of first impression in Wisconsin and there is no guidance 
from the United States Supreme Court, our focus is on 
the language of the Act as it applies to Daniel’s specific 
allegations. As explained below, we apply a plain meaning 
interpretation. While our interpretation of the Act is 
consistent with some of the authority the parties discuss, 
the case law that Armslist relies on does not significantly 
aid in the analysis, as discussed below.6
¶28 Our second observation is that the issue here is 
not whether Daniel sufficiently alleges negligence or any 
other claim in the complaint. The sole and limited issue is 
whether the complaint seeks to hold Armslist liable on a 
basis prohibited by the Act. As we explain, the pertinent 
language in the Act prohibits only theories of liability that 
treat Armslist as the publisher or speaker of the content of 
Linn’s or Radcliffe’s posts on the website, and we conclude 
that the complaint here relies on no such theory.
6. Because there appears to be no United States Supreme 
Court or Supreme Court of Wisconsin interpretation of the pertinent 
provisions of the Act, we consider the persuasive value of authority 
from various federal and state courts, some of which we summarize 
below, which have interpreted the Act’s pertinent provisions in other 
cases involving similar allegations. See Klein v. Board of Regents, 
Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 2003 WI App 118, ¶13, 265 Wis. 2d 543, 666 
N.W.2d 67 (“we are bound only by the opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court on questions of federal law”) (citation omitted).
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¶29 Having provided those general observations, 
we now briefly quote the key provisions of the Act, then 
summarize the arguments of the parties, before turning 
to the details of the Act, including our interpretation of 
the Act’s pertinent provisions and our conclusion that, 
with respect to the allegations in the complaint, the Act 
does not apply to confer immunity.
¶30 The following are the key provisions of the Act: 
(1) “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); and (2) “[n]o cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under 
any State or local law that is inconsistent with [§ 230].” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). We will sometimes call the first 
clause the shall-not-be-treated clause and the second the 
immunity clause, while generally using the term “the Act” 
to refer to their combined meaning.
¶31 We begin, brief ly, with the meaning of the 
immunity clause. Its wording is unambiguous for current 
purposes and provides for immunity (“no cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed”) if the 
conditions of the shall-not-be-treated clause are met. 
Daniel does not argue to the contrary.
¶32 We turn to the shall-not-be-treated clause, 
beginning with the topic of interpretative rules that we are 
to use to determine the scope of the immunity it provides. 
Daniel makes an argument, to which Armslist does not 
respond, based on a presumption against preemption 
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doctrine. We agree with Daniel that this doctrine applies 
here to create an exacting standard in determining the 
scope of immunity.
¶33 Explaining further, even where, as here, Congress 
has expressly provided for some degree of preemption 
of state law, when courts seek to “identify the domain 
expressly pre-empted,” we are to apply a “presumption 
against preemption.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
484, 494, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1996). In other 
words, the existence of an express federal preemption 
provision (as reflected in the immunity clause here) “does 
not immediately end the inquiry because the question of 
the substance and scope of Congress’[s] displacement of 
state law still remains.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 
70, 76, 129 S. Ct. 538, 172 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2008). Moreover, 
when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied 
by the states (as here, by creating immunity from state 
tort actions under a specified circumstance), courts are to 
assume that powers historically exercised by the states 
are “‘not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that [was] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” 
Id., at 77 (quoted source omitted); see also Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 115 L. Ed. 
2d 410 (1991) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the [] courts to be 
certain of Congress’[s] intent before finding that federal 
law overrides” the usual constitutional balance of federal 
and state powers.) (quoted source omitted). After Daniel 
asks us to apply this doctrine, Armslist has no response. 
Indeed, the word preemption does not appear in Armslist’s 
briefing. Thus, we proceed with our analysis bearing in 
mind the presumption against preemption.
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¶34 Armslist relies on case law that effectively 
construes the Act to provide “broad immunity” for 
claims that rest on allegations of activities by creators 
and operators of websites that those courts deem to be 
“publishing” activities. Armslist contends that, under the 
construction of the Act found in this case law, protected 
publishing activities include the allegations here involving 
design and operation of Armslist’s website. As we discuss 
more fully below, Armslist quotes case law that employs 
terminology not found in the Act and interprets the Act 
to provide immunity to websites whenever they act as 
“platforms” for the speech of third parties or whenever 
they exercise “editorial functions.” Based on this case 
law authority, Armslist argues, the complaint must be 
dismissed, because it seeks to hold Armslist liable for 
the publishing activities of using design and operation 
features of its website to encourage the type of third-party 
information content that caused the harm at issue.
¶35 For her part, Daniel points to case law that more 
narrowly construes the Act. She contends that her theory 
of liability against Armslist does not treat Armslist as the 
speaker or publisher of information content provided by 
Linn and Radcliffe through Armslist.com, but instead is 
based on a separate theory of liability. To repeat, Daniel 
argues, and the complaint alleges, that Armslist is liable 
for designing and operating its website in a way that 
encouraged prohibited sales, which she contends was a 
substantial factor in causing the shootings. These design 
and operational features allegedly encouraged “private, 
anonymous, illegal gun purchases,” such as Radcliffe’s 
purchase from Linn, which “enabled [Radcliffe] to 
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circumvent” a then-operative Wisconsin law mandating 
a 48-hour waiting period for federally licensed sales. The 
theory of liability, then, is that Armslist designed and 
operated Armslist.com so as to be a cause of the injuries 
alleged in the complaint.
¶36 We do not consider Armslist’s case-law-based 
arguments to be persuasive, because the cases Armslist 
relies on do not, in our view, come to grips with the plain 
language in the Act. Rather, we agree with Daniel’s 
argument that her theory of liability is not covered by the 
shall-not-be-treated clause in the Act, because her liability 
theory is not based on treating Armslist as the publisher 
or speaker of information content created by third parties.
¶37 In order to explain that conclusion, we now walk 
through in more detail the provisions in the shall-not-
be-treated clause: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
¶38 There is no dispute that Armslist.com was an 
“interactive computer service” provider. The Act defines 
the phrase “interactive computer service” expansively: 
“any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
¶39 The Act does not define the phrase, “shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 47 
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U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The terms “publisher” and “speaker” do 
not appear to have any specialized or technical meaning, 
but they are without doubt directly linked with the phrase 
“of any information.” For this reason, we conclude that the 
only reasonable interpretation of this language is that it 
is a reference to the specific act of publishing or speaking 
particular information, namely, information provided 
by another information content provider. We do not see 
any distinction that could matter, at least in the context 
of this case, between being treated as “the publisher” 
of information and being treated as “the speaker” of 
information. It appears that the terms publisher and 
speaker are both used simply to convey the notion that 
liability may not be based on treating a provider as the 
disseminator or propagator of the described information.
¶40 This brings us to the last pertinent phrase in 
the shall-not-be-treated clause: “provided by another 
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The 
Act defines “information content provider” broadly as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
for the creation or development of information provided 
through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.” § 230(f)(3). We perceive no dispute that Linn 
and Radcliffe, when they allegedly used the website to 
initiate and conduct portions of their transaction, were 
each “another information content provider.” 
¶41 Pulling together these observations, we can 
see that, in order to prevail, Armslist must show that 
the claims here treat Armslist as liable because it is 
an entity that published or spoke information provided 
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by Linn or Radcliffe, and Armslist must overcome the 
presumption against preemption.7 Armslist makes no such 
showing. Armslist points to nothing in the complaint that 
attempts to hold Armslist liable as a publisher or speaker 
of the content provided by Radcliffe and Linn. Instead, 
Armslist contends that the Act protects the activity of 
designing and operating a website, but without tying this 
interpretation to language in the Act. Stated differently, 
Armslist effectively ignores the Act’s phrase “publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another.”
¶42 If the goal of Congress were to establish the sort 
of broad immunity urged by Armslist, that is, immunity 
for all actions of websites that could be characterized as 
publishing activities or editorial functions, Congress could 
have used any number of formulations to that end. Instead, 
Congress limited immunity to a single circumstance: when 
a theory of liability treats the website creator or operator 
“as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.” Nothing in this 
language speaks more generally to website design and 
operation.
7. At least at a general level, this formulation is consistent 
with one used by federal circuit courts of appeal, namely, that the 
Act provides immunity if the following criteria are met: (1) the 
defendant “is a ‘provider or user of an interactive computer service’; 
(2) the plaintiff’s claim is based on ‘information provided by another 
information content provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [the 
defendant] ‘as the publisher or speaker’ of that information.” See, 
e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 
(1st Cir. 2007) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
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¶43 As noted above, Armslist’s argument consists 
almost entirely of strings of references to authority that 
it considers persuasive. We address case law below. But 
first, we address what we understand to be the minimal 
argument Armslist makes that is not tied to case law.
¶44 Armslist contends that “all of [the] ... alleged 
website defects are content-based, related either to the 
way information is presented on the site or to who is 
allowed to use it.” It may be fair to characterize all of 
the operational and design features alleged by Daniel 
to be in some sense “content-based.” However, in this 
respect, the content is not “information provided by 
another information content provider.” Rather, it is content 
created by Armslist, and there is no language in the Act 
immunizing Armslist from liability based on content that 
it creates.
¶45 Our interpretation of the Act is consistent with 
authority that we consider to be persuasive. See Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[l]ooking at the text [of the Act], it appears clear that 
[it does not] declare[] a general immunity from liability 
deriving from third-party content .... It is the language of 
the statute that defines and enacts the concerns and aims 
of Congress; a particular concern does not rewrite the 
language.”); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 
853 (9th Cir. 2016) (cautioning against applying the Act 
“beyond its narrow language and its purpose.” “Congress 
has not provided an all purpose get-out-of-jail-free card 
for businesses that publish user content on the internet” 
even when a claim “might have a marginal chilling effect 
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on internet publishing businesses.”). As Barnes explains, 
courts are to consider “whether the cause of action 
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as 
the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.” 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.
¶46 We note in particular the opinion of the Washington 
Supreme Court in J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, 
L.L.C., 184 Wn.2d 95, 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015). In J.S., 
the majority concluded that allegations that the website 
at issue developed and posted guidelines and content 
rules that facilitated child prostitution were sufficient 
to withstand a motion to dismiss based on the Act. 359 
P.3d at 717-18. In a concurring opinion, Justice Wiggins 
summarizes the position of courts that have “specifically 
rejected the subsection 230(c)(1) defense when the 
underlying cause of action does not treat the information 
content provider as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of another’s 
information.” Id. at 723-24 (Wiggins, J., concurring). 
Opinions cited by J. Wiggins include City of Chicago, Ill. 
v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 365, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(online broker could be liable for unpaid taxes on sales of 
tickets listed by users because liability did not depend 
on who “‘publishes’ any information or is a ‘speaker’” 
unlike claims “for defamation, obscenity, or copyright 
infringement.”), and Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“‘The Communications Decency Act was not 
meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.’”).
¶47 We note that our interpretation of the Act does 
not deprive it of value to defendants in tort cases, but 
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instead provides concrete, if narrow, immunity. For 
example, websites cannot be held liable under the Act 
merely because they allow the posting of third-party 
defamatory comments, because that would treat the 
websites as the publishers or speakers of the comments. 
See Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d at 851 (defamation 
provides a “clear illustration” of the intent of the shall-
not-be-treated clause).
¶48 It follows from what we have said that we do not 
consider persuasive case law, cited by Armslist, that has 
interpreted the Act in arguably analogous situations to this 
case to confer immunity based on “publishing” activities 
of website operators.8 We believe that the cases cited by 
Armslist are effectively reading into the Act language that 
is not present, to the effect that the Act provides general 
immunity for all activities that consist of designing or 
operating a website that includes content from others. 
See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (Act conferred immunity on 
Backpage.com against liability for sex trafficking-related 
claims, because the allegations relied on the website’s 
actions as designer and operator of a website providing a 
forum for publishing information content posted by third 
parties, rather than as an information content provider 
itself or as an encourager of prohibited activity); Herrick 
v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d. 579, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
8. Armslist incorrectly asserts that the circuit court’s ruling 
here was consistent with “virtually every court in the United States.” 
Having said that, we recognize that there is divided authority on 
how to interpret the pertinent language of the Act, which addresses 
activities in the context of relatively new and evolving technologies.
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LEXIS 12346, 2018 WL 566457, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 
2018) (Act conferred immunity on interactive computer 
service because it “may not be held liable for so-called 
‘neutral assistance,’ [which involves providing] tools and 
functionality that are available equally to bad actors”; 
explaining that design and “[c]ategorization features,” 
such as a drop-down menu, “constitute quintessential 
‘neutral assistance.’”) (quoted sources omitted).
¶49 Some such courts have interpreted the Act to 
provide immunity for each activity of website creators or 
operators that could be characterized as being one of “a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions.” See Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997); 
see also Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21. This is sometimes 
stated in terms of immunity for activity involving mere 
“neutral means” of allowing users to post on websites, and 
sometimes in terms of protection for “passive” conduct by 
the website. See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 
1358, 410 U.S. App. D.C. 187 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (interpreting 
the Act to hold that “a website does not create or develop 
content when it merely provides a neutral means by 
which third parties can post information of their own 
independent choosing online” and has immunity from 
liability for providing this “neutral means”); Roommates.
com, 521 F.3d at 1173-74 (online marketplace provider “is 
not responsible, in whole or in part, for the development 
of ... content[ ] which comes entirely from subscribers and 
is passively displayed by” the website).
¶50 Simply put, we are unable to tie these case-law 
applications to the Act’s specific language and, for that 
reason, do not find the cases Armslist relies on helpful.
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¶51 Moreover, the weakness of Armslist’s argument 
is all the more glaring in light of the presumption against 
preemption that we address at ¶¶32-33 supra. To repeat, 
the Act uses the narrow terms we have addressed, while 
the cases cited by Armslist effectively ignore the terms 
of the Act. Instead, these opinions essentially collapse the 
entire analysis into a broad and unsupported definition of 
“publisher.” The Act does not, for example, provide lists 
of website features that do or do not represent traditional 
editorial functions, nor does it use the terms “neutral” or 
“passive” or any similar terms. This leaves courts without 
principled and consistent ways to define “traditional 
editorial functions,” “neutral means,” or “passive display.” 
We cannot lightly presume that Congress would intend 
that the highly consequential immunity determination 
could turn on how courts might choose to characterize 
website features as being more or less like traditional 
editorial functions, or more or less neutral or passive, 
especially without reasonably specific statutory direction 
or guidelines.
¶52 In sum, the Act, and in particular the shall-not-
be-treated clause, does not immunize Armslist from 
claims in the complaint because the claims and the 
supporting allegations do not seek to hold Armslist liable 
for publishing another’s information content. Instead, the 
claims seek to hold Armslist liable for its own alleged 
actions in designing and operating its website in ways 
that caused injuries to Daniel.
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CONCLUSION
¶53 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence per 
se claim and separately conclude that the Act does not 
preempt state law to provide immunity to the defendants. 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court order dismissing 
the complaint against the Armslist defendants and remand 
the cause.
By the Court.—Order reversed.
Recommended for publication in the official reports.
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APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN  
CIVIL DIVISION MILWAUKEE COUNTY  
FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2016
STATE OF WISCONSIN, CIRCUIT COURT, 
MILWAUKEE COUNTY
Case No. 2015-cv-8710
YASMEEN DANIEL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
ZINA DANIEL HAUGHTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ARMSLIST, LLC, BRIAN MANCINI, BROC 
ELMORE, JONATHAN GIBBON, DEVIN LINN, 
ABC INS. CO., DEF INS. CO., ESTATE OF 
RADCLIFFE HAUGHTON, BY HIS SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR JENNIFER F. VALENTI,
Defendants,
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY  
OF CONNECTICUT,
Intervening Plaintiff.
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ORDER ON THE NOVEMBER 1, 2016 HEARING
Defendant Devin Linn’s (“Linn”) motion to dismiss 
as to the claim of negligence per se asserted by Plaintiffs 
Yasmeen Daniel, individually and as Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Zina Daniel Haughton (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”), Defendant Armslist, LLC’s (“Armslist”) 
motion to dismiss as to the claims of negligence, negligence 
per se, negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil 
conspiracy, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, public 
nuisance and wrongful death asserted by Plaintiffs, 
and Defendants Brian Mancini’s and Jonathan Gibbon’s 
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) motion to 
dismiss as to the claims of negligence, negligence per se, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, 
aiding and abetting tortious conduct, public nuisance, 
wrongful death, and piercing the corporate veil asserted 
by Plaintiffs, came to be heard before the Honorable Judge 
Glenn H. Yamahiro on November 1, 2016.
Plaintiffs appeared by Attorneys Patrick O. Dunphy 
of the law firm Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Jonathan E. Lowy 
of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence Legal Action 
Project, and Jacqueline C. Wolff and Samantha J. Katze 
of the law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. Armslist 
and the Individual Defendants appeared by Attorneys 
Michael D. McClintock of the law firm McAfee & Taft and 
Eric J. Van Schyndle of the law firm Quarles & Brady LLP. 
Linn appeared by Attorney Dillon Ambrose of the law 
firm Davis & Kuelthau, S.C. And, Defendant the Estate of 
Radcliffe Haughton appeared by Attorney Colette Reinke 
of the law firm Fuchs & Boyle, S.C.
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IT IS SO ORDERED, for the reasons set forth on the 
record on November 1, 2016, that the negligence per se 
claim asserted by Plaintiffs is dismissed as to Linn with 
prejudice and without costs; and that all claims asserted by 
Plaintiffs against Armslist, Brian Mancini and Jonathan 
Gibbon are dismissed with prejudice and without costs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED that this is a final order for 
purposes of appeal.
Dated this       day of         , 2016.
   The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro
Dated this 28th day of November, 2016
BY THE COURT:
Electronically signed by
Glenn H Yamahiro-34, Judge
Glenn H Yamahiro-34, Judge
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APPENDIX D — MOTION HEARING OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN 
DATED NOVEMBER 1, 2016
[1]STATE OF WISCONSIN, CIRCUIT COURT, 
BRANCH 34, MILWAUKEE COUNTY
Case No. 15-CV-8710
YASMEEN DANIEL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
ZINA DANIEL HAUGHTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ARMSLIST, LLC, BRIAN MANCINI, BROC 
ELMORE, JONATHAN GIBBON, DEVIN LINN, 
ABC INS. CO., DEF INS. CO., ESTATE OF 
RADCLIFFE HAUGHTON, BY HIS SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR JENNIFER F. VALENTI,
Defendants,
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY  
OF CONNECTICUT,
Intervening Plaintiff.
Appendix D
74a
MOTION HEARING
HONORABLE GLENN H. YAMAHIRO
Circuit Judge, Presiding
[3]TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
THE CLERK: 15-CV-8710, Yasmeen Daniel versus 
ARMSLIST, LLC. Appearances.
MR. DUNPHY: Your Honor, the plaintiffs are 
appearing by Patrick Dunphy, John Lowy, Jacqueline 
Wolff, and Samantha Katze.
The bulk of the argument on plaintiff’s side this 
morning will be done by Mr. Lowy and may be augmented 
by Ms. Katze depending on the questions the Court may 
have.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. McCLINTOCK: Good morning, Michael 
McClintock, firm of McAfee & Taft, on behalf of defendants 
ARMSLIST, LLC, Brian Mancini, Jonathan Gibbon and 
Broc Elmore. Also with me is Eric Van Schyndle from 
Quarles and Brady.
MS. REINKE: Colette Reinke, the law firm of Fuchs 
and Boyle. I’m here on behalf of John Fuchs and the Estate 
of Radcliffe Haughton.
MR. AMBROSE: Dillon Ambrose of the law firm of 
Davis & Kuelthau on behalf of Defendant Devin Linn.
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THE COURT: Good morning. Times Square, right? 
Was just there last month. I can’t fathom trying to get in 
and out of there to go to work every [4]day. Anybody else 
from out of town?
MR. McCLINTOCK: I am, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Where are you from?
MR. McCLINTOCK: From Oklahoma.
THE COURT: Okay. I anticipate that there are some 
that would like to supplement the record orally based 
on Mr. Dunphy’s statement. I don’t have any specific 
questions at this time, but I will afford an opportunity 
for anybody that wants to orally supplement the record 
starting with the moving party.
I’ll just ask you to, whoever is speaking, to make sure 
the microphone is in front of you so the court reporter can 
get everything.
MR. McCLINTOCK: Thank you, Your Honor, may it 
please the Court, it is our motion.
As I said, I represent ARMSLIST, LLC, and the 
individual owners. Of note, for the record, discovery 
-- jurisdictional discovery is granted by the Court 
and conducted by the parties. As a result of that, the 
defendant, Broc Elmore, was voluntarily dismissed; and 
so for a matter of housekeeping and to just make sure the 
court record is clear and the Court is aware, if it wasn’t 
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otherwise in the filings, Mr. Elmore has been dismissed 
-- voluntarily dismissed from the case.
***
[43]and they said specifically that Congress did not 
intend to protect websites such as ARMSLIST with 
allegations such as these; and again, those allegations are 
focused not on Mr. Linn’s posting but on this prohibited 
purchaser’s access. Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. While any failures 
on the part of the Court here will not be based upon the 
lack of input or the quality of the briefing that’s been done 
here, which was very, very good.
I think the facts of the situation, I believe the 
next couple days we are approaching the unfortunate 
anniversary of the deceased in this case; and the 
Court certainly, and I think the parties agree, is not 
unsympathetic to the deceased, family of the deceased.
The issues of domestic violence, not only in this case 
but throughout the country, and the interplay between 
firearms and the killing of victims of domestic violence, 
which is a long standing and continuing problem, 
which despite many people’s best efforts have yet to be 
effectively addressed. The Court is not unfamiliar with 
those dynamics having been a long-term faculty member 
of the National Judicial Institute of Domestic Violence 
teaching [44]judges across the country as to the dynamics 
of domestic violence as well as it’s lethality.
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The Court is also not unfamiliar as a person that 
reads the news as to the issues regarding firearms in this 
country and firearm violence, and the conflict between 
those who support the Second Amendment, and in the 
context of this case, the First Amendment, and those 
that would like to see some reasonable parameters put 
upon the sales and distribution of firearms, especially as 
it relates to those persons who really are legally ineligible 
to possess them.
And probably the ultimate tragedy here is that, based 
upon the state of the law, as people were on notice prior 
to Ms. Zina Haughton’s murder, but basically the same 
thing occurred under similar circumstances in 2011. 
I think it’s almost a certainty this will not be the last. 
And to that extent, it’s a tragedy of the extent that Ms. 
Haughton’s death may be in vain based upon the history 
of the legislative branch in addressing or not addressing 
the issues that are brought to bear based upon the facts 
of this case.
I will begin by addressing the negligence per se claim. 
I think the facts here are not really in [45]dispute.
The case arises out of Mr. Haughton’s purchase of a 
firearm by the ARMSLIST or with the assistance of the 
ARMSLIST.com website that he was, in fact, subject to 
a domestic violence restraining order when he used the 
website to locate a private seller, in this case Mr. Linn, 
who ultimately sold him the firearm.
The gun was a semi-automatic handgun, three high 
capacity magazines, for $500.
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Based on the pleadings, it appears that Mr. Linn did 
not question Mr. Haughton as to his need for the firearm 
or attempt to engage in any formal or informal background 
check to ascertain whether or not this buyer would be 
legally ineligible. There’s no allegation, I believe, that Mr. 
Linn searched CCAP; and it was the following day that 
Mr. Haughton went to the Azana Spa and Salon and killed 
Ms. Haughton and two of her co-workers.
And I think it’s clear that Ms. Daniel was also affected 
by the trauma of these killings, and so she also has claims 
before the Court.
The legal standard on a motion to dismiss is to test 
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Under Evans versus 
Cameron at 212 Wis. 2d 421. On the [46]context of this 
motion, although to a certain extent it’s a hybrid, there have 
been facts interwoven with these briefs that almost make 
this a hybrid between a motion to dismiss and summary 
judgment. But the Court is treating this as a motion to 
dismiss. And in that context, well-pleaded facts are accepted 
as true. Legal conclusions alone stated in the complaint are 
not accepted as true, and they are insufficient to enable a 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss under Data Key 
Partners versus Permira Advisors, LLC, 356 Wis. 2d 665.
In 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the 
plausibility pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic 
Corporation versus Twombly at 550 U.S. 544 and Data 
Key Partners at 2014 Wis. 86. That standard requires 
plaintiffs to allege facts that suggest more than a 
possibility of a claim as a threshold requirement under 
Wisconsin Statute 802.02 sub (1) sub (a).
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To satisfy the statute, a complaint must plead facts, 
which if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bare legal 
conclusions set out in the complaint provide no assistance 
in warding off a motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs must 
allege facts that, if true, plausibly suggest a violation of 
[47]applicable law.
Under the Twombly plausibility pleading standard, 
a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the Court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged. Under Ashcroft versus Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662. At this point there is little other guidance as to what 
plausibility means in Wisconsin.
In terms of the negligence per se claim, plaintiff has 
alleged that Mr. Linn violated, quote, violated federal, 
state and local statutes, regulations and ordinances, 
including without limitation 18 U.S.C. sub (2) 18 U.S.C. 
-- I should say Section 2. 18 U.S.C. Section 922 sub (g) and 
Wisconsin Statute 941.20 sub (1).
The above statutes impose criminal liability but are 
silent on whether civil liability should also attach.
Plaintiffs also attempt to argue violation of 18 U.S.C. 
Section 922 sub (d) sub (8). Although the complaints fails 
to identify Linn as an aider and abettor.
Regardless of this failure, none of the statutes cited 
by the plaintiffs provide a clear,
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[53]suitability of the federal criminal and regulatory 
standard for use as a reasonable person standard in 
negligence cases.
The Olson court analyzed the statutory enforcement 
mechanisms and found that, quote, no reference to the 
imposition of civil liability for violation of the criminal 
standards set forth by the Act appears in the legislative 
history, at page 250.
The Court held, and this Court is bound to accept, the 
violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922 are not negligence per 
se. The Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity 
to review the Olson decision, but the Court declined to 
hear the case.
Therefore, because the holdings -- the Court finds that 
the holding of Olson is still good law and binding on the 
Court. The Court finds the plaintiff’s negligence per se 
claimed against Mr. Linn fails as a matter of law.
As to the broader range of claims, ARMSLIST, LLC 
formed in 2007 to be a, quote, firearms marketplace. Other 
private sale websites, including Amazon, Ebay, Craigslist, 
and others, no longer sell firearms.
ARMSLIST does not require users to register in 
order to post on its website.
[54]The website has a number of features that enable 
a user to filter out vendors. ARMSLIST does a party -- 
Appendix D
81a
ARMSLIST directs users to contact their local sheriff’s 
office and/or ATF Branch if they have questions about 
safe and legal gun transfers.
Yasmeen Daniel brought multiple claims against 
ARMSLIST, LLC, it’s members, and Mr. Linn. Her claims 
against ARMSLIST, LLC and its members, Mr. Mancini, 
Mr. Gibbon are the subjects of the motion to dismiss.
The defendants advance a number of grounds in 
support of their motion to dismiss.
First, they assert the Communications Decency Act, 
referred to as the CDA, precludes all the plaintiff’s claims 
because such claims attempt to hold the defendants liable 
for materials posted by third parties. Alternatively, they 
have argued the plaintiff’s negligence claims must fail 
because ARMSLIST did not have a special relationship 
as that term is understood in the law with Ms. Haughton.
ARMSLIST defendants have asserted that the CDA 
at Section 230 sub (c) prevents all the plaintiff’s claims. 
The applicability of the CDA is essentially an argument 
that plaintiff’s claims are precluded by federal statute.
[55]Defendants have made their motion under Section 
802.06 sub (2) sub (a) sub 6, which is failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. A codification of federal 
rule 12 (b) (6). The CDA is an affirmative defense which 
does not justify dismissal under Rule 12 (b) (6), under Doe 
versus GTE Corporation, 347 F. 3d 655, and plaintiff has 
referenced the inappropriate forum of defendant’s motion 
in the footnote.
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After the footnote, plaintiff has argued the applicability 
of the CDA. The defendant may raise the affirmative 
defense of claim preclusion either by motion before filing 
the answer or as an affirmative defense in the answer 
under 802.06 sub (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
Here the defendants have filed their motion before 
filing the answer, and the motion to dismiss on statutory 
grounds should be supported by the applicable statute 
under which the claim preclusion defense is based, and that 
brings us to what the Court has referenced with regard 
to this being a little bit of a hybrid between a motion to 
dismiss and summary judgment.
Certainly, there has been more than adequate briefing 
as to the substantive issues before the [56]Court. Judgment 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show there’s no genuine issue as to 
any material fact pertinent to whether the plaintiff can 
recover under the applicable law under 802.08 sub (2).
In this case, the original motion was filed in March 
of 2016. I believe that was followed by the interlude at 
federal court before that matter was returned to this 
court. Nevertheless, there has been a reasonable amount 
of time to produce any relevant material pertinent to this 
Court’s determination on the motion.
So to that extent, it’s treated as a motion for summary 
judgment.
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Although perhaps not as absolute as the defendant has 
argued, the Court does believe that the CDA preempts 
civil liability in this case. It provides under sub (1), 
treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user 
of an interactive computer device shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.
And under sub (2), civil liability. No provider or 
user of an interactive computer service [57]shall be held 
liable on account of, A, any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material 
that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or, B, any action taken to enable 
or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to materials 
described in paragraph (1).
The CDA is not a general prohibition of civil liability 
for website operators. Under Chicago Lawyers Committee 
for Civil Rights Under the Law, Incorporated versus 
Craigslist, Incorporated, at 519 F. 3d 666. Instead, the 
CDA provides a safety net to a web host that does filter 
out offensive material by proclaiming that such provider 
is not liable to the censored consumer. The 7th Circuit 
noted CDA plays a limited role, using as an example that, 
in quote, information content provider may be liable for 
contributory infringement if their system is designed to 
help people steal music or other material in copyright. 
At page 670.
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And in this case, the Court believes that ARMSLIST 
has taken a passive approach to monitoring [58]content 
where the users may not flag material if the user believes 
the post is for illegal gun sale. In addition, ARMSLIST 
mandates the users accept its terms of service, which 
include one provision declaring that the user will not use 
the site illegally. Further, the terms of service explicitly 
tell users that ARMSLIST will not investigate or monitor 
postings or sales to insure compliance with local laws.
It’s really based on the website design that the plaintiff 
has alleged negligence, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, public nuisance, wrongful death, and aiding and 
abetting of tortious conduct; and, obviously, plaintiff has 
also brought the alter ego and civil conspiracy claims.
The CDA declares that an online information system 
may not be treated as a publisher or speaker of information 
or postings by a third party. This immunity only applies, 
quote, if the interactive computer service provider is not 
also an information content provider, which is defined as 
someone who is responsible in whole or in part with the 
creation or development of the offending content under 
the Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley case 
at 521 F.3d at page 1162.
Based on that, the Court believes this case [59]turns 
on whether ARMSLIST merely hosts advertisements, 
in which case they are protected by CDA immunity, 
or whether they also help develop the content of those 
advertisements, in which case they are not protected by 
CDA immunity.
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A website operator can be both a service provider and 
a content provider: If it passively displays content that is 
created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service 
provider with respect to that content. But as to content 
that it creates itself, or is responsible in whole or in part 
for creating or developing, the website is also a content 
provider. Thus, a website may be immune from civil 
liability for some of the content it displays to the public 
but be subject to liability for other content.
Again, under the Fair Housing Council case versus 
Roommates.com, 521 F. 3d 1157. A website operator, 
however, does not develop content by simply maintaining 
neutral policies prohibiting or eliminating certain content. 
Under Dart versus Craigslist, 665 F.Supp 2d 961.
Viewing the plaintiff’s allegations in the light most 
favorable to her, plaintiff has alleged that ARMSLIST’s 
design induces buyers and sellers to [60]engage in conduct 
contrary to state and federal law. As a service provider, 
ARMSLIST is an intermediary and indifferent to the 
content of ads made by third parties under Doe versus 
GTE Corporation, 347 F. 3d 655.
Certainly, the Court appreciates plaintiff’s arguments 
that ARMSLIST is inherently engaged in dangerous 
business with foreseeable injuries. The plaintiff fails to 
allege facts which establish or dispute that ARMSLIST 
is materially engaged in creating or developing the illegal 
content on its page. The 7th Circuit has articulated 
ARMSLIST’s services and subsequent potential for 
liability as follows:
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That web hosting services likewise may be used to 
carry out illegal activities does not justify condemning 
their provision whenever a given customer turns out to 
be crooked. The user did not demand a quantity or type 
of service that is specialized to unlawful activities, nor 
do plaintiffs allege that the bandwidth or other services 
required were themselves tip offs so that the web host, 
like the seller of sugar to a bootlegger, must have known 
that the customer had no legitimate use for the service. 
Just as the telephone company is not liable as an aider and 
[61]abettor for tapes or narcotics sold by phone, and the 
Postal Service is not liable for tapes sold and delivered 
by mail, so a web host cannot be classified as an aider and 
abettor of criminal activities conducted through access to 
the Internet. Under Doe versus GTE Corporation.
In this case, as it stands right now and at the time of 
the tragedies that are subject to this lawsuit, ARMSLIST 
does provide a lawful service. Plaintiff has alleged that 
the ability to filter ads so that only private sellers can be 
seen is an inducement for prohibited purchasers.
The Court believes that the language in Doe versus 
GTE Corporation disposes of that argument. Why? 
Because intrastate private sales of firearms are lawful. 
Plaintiff has not alleged that anything was inherently 
unlawful about Mr. Linn or Mr. Haughton’s posts. 
Plaintiff ’s allegations in the complaint seek to hold 
ARMSLIST liable for creating a space where consumers 
can post advertisements and also failing to police or edit 
those postings for illegal activity.
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These claims appear on their face to be an attempt to 
artfully plead ARMSLIST is a publisher without actually 
calling it that; and, obviously, treating an Internet service 
provider as a publisher [62]is expressly barred by the 
CDA.
In the Chicago Lawyers case, the plaintiffs tried to 
argue Craigslist could be liable as the one who caused 
to be made printed or published any illegal notice, 
statement or advertisement. Such an argument is similar 
to plaintiff’s argument here that ARMSLIST effectively 
caused prohibited purchasers to use the website to obtain 
firearms.
The 7th Circuit found that, quote, nothing in the 
service Craigslist offers induces anyone to post any 
particular listing or express a preference for illegal 
conduct, at page 671.
Given this finding, the Court stated that a plaintiff, 
quote, cannot sue the messenger just because the message 
deals with third party’s plan to engage in unlawful 
discrimination, close quote, at page 672. The Court 
believes the facts in this case are similar to those in the 
Chicago Lawyers case.
Plaintiff has alleged that ARMSLIST induces illegal 
and unsafe transfers by providing no means to report 
illegal or unsafe postings, refusing to make users register 
so that either a cooling off period or background check can 
be completed and allowing users to limit their search to 
private individuals as opposed to licensed dealers.
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[63]Plaintiffs imply that ARMSLIST is really a gun 
show doing on line what it could not do lawfully off line. 
However, unlike the case in the Fair Housing Council 
case, the tools provided by ARMSLIST have a neutral 
and legal purpose. Roommates.com was found to be 
exempt from the immunity granted by the CDA because 
the website required users to enter their race, sex, sexual 
orientation and preferred characteristics of any potential 
roommate in order to even utilize the site. The Court found 
that content, mandated and provided by the website, only 
had an improper purpose, which was to provide a basis 
for people to discriminate in housing.
In this case, wanting to buy a firearm from a private 
seller as opposed to a dealer does have a lawful purpose 
because intrastate private sales without a waiting period 
or background are lawful in Wisconsin. This Court is 
unable to find that ARMSLIST materially participates 
in development or content of its advertisements. As such, 
the Court believes ARMSLIST is entitled to immunity 
under the CDA Section 230 sub (c).
Defendants have argued the First Circuit’s reasoning 
in Jane Doe No. 1 versus Backpages.com, LLC 817 F. 3d 
page 12 is applicable to this case, and the [64]Court agrees.
In 2010, the Backpage.com competitor, Craigslist, 
closed its adult advertising section due to concerns 
about sex trafficking. Seeing an opportunity, Backpages 
expanded its marketing footprint in the adult advertising 
arena; and appellants in Jane Doe No. 1 asserted 
Backpages designed its website to make sex trafficking 
easier.
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Specifically, the appellants argued Backpages’, 
quote, rules and processes governing the content of 
advertisements were designed to encourage illegal 
activity. In addition, Backpages did not require users to 
register or verify their contact information.
These are the same, if not substantially similar, 
allegations to what we have before us today. Plaintiffs 
allege that ARMSLIST fills a void left by other online 
retailers, including Ebay, Craigslist, Amazon, who refuse 
to facilitate the sale of firearms. Plaintiff also cites 
ARMSLIST’s failure to require users to register or verify 
that they are aware of gun laws, and also the company’s 
failure to review postings for legality or unsafe conditions.
The appellants in Jane Doe No. 1 also attempted to 
frame their claims against the web host [65]as claims 
regarding a design and operation of the website as 
opposed to a publisher or speaker.
The First Circuit provided the following response to 
that:
Without exception, the appellants’ well-pleaded claims 
address the structure and operation of the Backpage 
website; that is, Backpages decision about how to treat 
postings. Those claims challenge features that are part 
and parcel of the overall design and operation of the 
website, such as the lack of phone number verification, the 
rules about whether a person may post after attempting to 
enter a forbidden term, and the procedure for uploading 
photographs. Features such as these, which reflect choices 
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about what content can appear on the website and in what 
form, are editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions. The Court believes the 
same is true here.
Without exception, the plaintiff’s claims all incorporate 
the structure and operation of ARMSLIST as the cause of 
Mr. Haughton’s access to a firearm. These claims assert 
that the features of ARMSLIST, such as the ability to 
search for private sales, and lack of user registration, 
are negligent. These features reflect choices about what 
content can appear [66]on the website and in what form, 
and are editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions.
So even though the Court finds that the CDA does 
preclude plaintiff’s claims, the Court is clearly aware of the 
dangers posed by a website like ARMSLIST. Obviously, 
steps could be taken to make the weapons traceable, the 
sales traceable. Obviously, there’s been a lot of discussion 
in a number of cases about the concept of policing websites, 
which in many cases is almost impossible based on the 
volume of postings and the number of employees that 
typically work at most of these sites. But again, certainly 
the legislature could require more than what it currently 
does.
And naive as it may be, there is always the possibility 
of actors deciding that they want to do what is morally 
correct. God forbid to raise that in a courtroom. But I 
don’t think it’s only based upon liability that almost every 
other website that engages in sales of just about anything 
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has decided to bail out of weapon sales. Because certainly 
there would be grounds, as there are in this case, for Ebay, 
Craigslist, or anybody else, to take refuge behind the CDA 
and continue to sell firearms.
[67]So the Court is certainly not unsympathetic to the 
claims and the uphill battle of the plaintiffs in this case 
given the current legislative or statutory landscape as it 
relates to the CDA and what is, I think, well-documented 
impotence on the part of legislative branch at this time to 
take any reasonable measures to police the distribution 
of firearms, and in particular the private sale of firearms, 
which continue to lawfully allow people to circumvent any 
meaningful background checking of those who might be 
statutorily ineligible to possess a firearm.
Based on the statements of  the Court and 
notwithstanding the Court’s personal views, the Court 
is granting ARMSLIST’s motions; and those will include 
motions under the negligence claim based upon the Court’s 
previous statements that it attempts to treat ARMSLIST 
and its member owners as publisher and speaker under the 
CDA, and the Court finds that ARMSLIST, at least under 
the laws of passive web host that does not participate in 
whole or part in the creation of its content, and the fact 
that the design features of the website can serve a legal 
purpose.
The Court finds that the appropriate negligence 
standard are moot given this Court’s interpretation of 
the CDA. The Court also has [68]previously ruled and 
extends the ruling regarding negligence per se to all 
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plaintiffs based on the fact the Court finds Olson versus 
Ratzel controlling, and so the negligence per se claims 
will be ordered dismissed as to all parties.
The Court finds the negligence infliction of emotional 
distress claim, that again inherent in the claim, is a 
design of the website, and the allegation ARMSLIST 
had a duty to employ sufficient questioning and screening 
of customers, as well as design a website that complied 
with existing laws, as set forth in paragraph 154 of the 
complaint, claiming ARMSLIST had a duty to screen 
users attempts to treat ARMSLIST as a publisher of 
content. In the Court’s opinion, users and their posts 
are not directed by ARMSLIST, and ARMSLIST does 
not mandate responses or information which is unlawful. 
The CDA bars such treatment under Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley versus Roommates and 
really, I think, the distinction between that case and the 
Chicago Lawyers case and this case, draw significant and 
dispositive lines as to when a website crosses a line into 
publishing and speaking.
The civil conspiracy. I think the defendant -- plaintiff’s 
claim under that part of the complaint is that Mr. Mancini 
and Mr. Olson (sic) [69]conspired to create a website to 
serve the illegal gun market. In Wisconsin, civil conspiracy 
has been defined as a combination of two or more persons 
by some concerted action to accomplish some unlawful 
purpose or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose 
not in itself unlawful. Under Mendelson versus Blatz 
Brewing Company, 9 Wis. 2d 487.
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In this case, plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant 
conspired to circumvent federal gun laws through 
ARMSLIST.com. The law of civil conspiracy is further 
characterized under Singer versus Singer, 245 Wis. 2d 
191.
As quote, it is established law of this state that 
there is no such thing as a civil act for conspiracy. There 
is an action for damages caused by acts pursuant to a 
conspiracy but none for the conspiracy alone. In a civil 
action for damages for an executed conspiracy, the gist 
of the action is the damages.
In this case, plaintiff has alleged damages insofar as 
defendant’s civil conspiracy resulted in the death of Ms. 
Haughton.
Court finds the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim is also 
barred by the CDA. The 7th Circuit has found that where, 
quote, nothing in the service [70]offered induces anyone 
to post any particular listing or express a preference for 
illegal conduct. The service provider is protected by the 
CDA under the Chicago Lawyers case.
Given this finding, the Court stated a plaintiff cannot 
sue the messenger just because the message reveals a 
third-party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination. 
The plaintiff ’s civil conspiracy claim attempts to 
accomplish the goal disallowed by the Chicago lawyers 
case. ARMSLIST’s service has a legal purpose, and the 
content provided by ARMSLIST is neutral and does 
not suggest or require illegal content. ARMSLIST and 
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its individual members cannot be liable for conduct and 
content posted by third parties. Such liability would 
require the Court to treat ARMSLIST and its members as 
speakers or publishers of the content. Because plaintiff’s 
civil conspiracy claim attempts to treat ARMSLIST as 
a publisher of the illegal content in ARMSLIST.com, the 
CDA bars liability.
In addition, the Jane Doe No. 1 case that’s been 
referenced also supports a finding that the civil conspiracy 
claim is barred by the CDA. The civil conspiracy complaint 
addresses the, quote, structure and operation of the 
service provider’s website. [71]Individual owners are 
entitled to protection under the CDA unless they have 
been personally involved in or responsible for the website’s 
illegal conduct. Under Klayman versus Zuckerberg, 753 
F. 3d 1354.
Here nothing in the complaint alleges that Mr. Mancini 
or Mr. Gibbon were personally involved in illegal conduct. 
Instead the complaint alleges the owners designed the 
website to induce illegal conduct, which is a publishing 
function under cases like the Fair Housing Council and 
Jane Doe No. 1.
Absent allegations or facts demonstrating that either 
member was materially involved in illegal sale or posting, 
the CDA bars liability. Based on that, the Court finds that 
the civil conspiracy claim is barred by the CDA.
Plaintiff’s claim with regard to abetting -- aiding and 
abetting tortious conduct, the Court also finds it is barred 
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by the CDA. Plaintiff’s claim that ARMSLIST, quote, 
aided, encouraged, urged and acquiesced in Mr. Linn’s sale 
to Mr. Haughton. This claim attempts to treat ARMSLIST 
as the speaker and publisher of the advertisement made 
by Mr. Linn. The claim further states that ARMSLIST, 
quote, brokered the transaction between a dangerous, 
prohibited purchaser and Linn. However, such claims 
again treat [72]ARMSLIST as the speaker and publisher 
of content. ARMSLIST did not participate in the sales or 
advertisements beyond creating a forum for the posting.
Because plaintiff’s aiding and abetting claim is based 
on ARMSLIST’s failure to take affirmative steps to censor 
its users or manage its content, the claim attempts to 
hold ARMSLIST liable as a publisher and is precluded 
by the CDA.
The Court believes that the public nuisance and 
wrongful death claims are moot based upon the Court’s 
ruling on negligence and the CDA. I don’t disagree with 
the alter ego position taken by ARMSLIST in this case. 
But again, that requires a judgment before the piercing 
claim before there’s grounds to pierce a corporate veil.
Court also believes the claim from Travelers for 
repayment of worker’s compensation payments is moot as 
related to ARMSLIST, Mr. Mancini and Mr. Gibbon, given 
the Court findings regarding negligence and the CDA.
As to personal jurisdiction, the Court is not making 
any findings in that regard at this time because, as its 
set forth, plaintiffs would be entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on that question.
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[73]So in summary, the Court has found the CDA bars 
plaintiff’s claims against ARMSLIST as a matter of law. 
Because the plaintiff’s claims seek to treat ARMSLIST 
and it’s members as a publisher of web content, I will ask 
plaintiffs for -- ARMSLIST to file orders under the five-
day rule. Is there anything further at this time?
MR. McCLINTOCK: Nothing further, Your Honor.
MR. LOWY: No, Your Honor.
MR. AMBROSE: No.
THE COURT: I know we have claims remaining, 
especially as relates to Mr. Linn. I don’t know if parties 
want some time to reflect, obtain transcript, make a 
decision regarding appellate review.
I would propose scheduling a telephone status hearing 
at a reasonable time interval, whether it’s 30, 45 days -- 
can probably do 60 if that’s what everybody needs -- and 
just to find out then just where everyone is at based upon 
today’s hearing.
MR. DUNPHY: Your Honor, I’ll speak with counsel for 
other parties and get back to the Court within the Court’s 
guidelines for follow-up and telephone conference date.
THE COURT: Heads are in the affirmative.
MR. McCLINTOCK: Yes.
[74]MR. AMBROSE: Yes.
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MR. McCLINTOCK: We agree.
THE COURT: Is 30 days enough or you want some 
more time?
MR. DUNPHY: I’d like to discuss it first with other 
counsel to see. 30 days may well be enough. We may need 45.
THE COURT: We can work that out off the record, and 
let the clerk know what works for you; and as I say, I think, 
you’re welcome to come down. But I think it’s sufficient to 
appear by telephone for that purpose. Thank you.
MR. LOWY: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
MR. AMBROSE: Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded)
***
[75]STATE OF WISCONSIN
MILWAUKEE COUNTY
I, Joanna Koepp, do hereby certify that I am a 
Registered Professional Reporter, that as such I reported 
the foregoing proceedings, later transcribed by me, and 
that it is true and correct to the best of my abilities.
  (Electronically signed by Joanna Koepp)
       Joanna Koepp - Official Reporter.
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APPENDIX E — 47 USCA § 230
47 U.S.C.A. § 230
TITLE 47. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CHAPTER 5. WIRE OR RADIO COMMUNICATION 
 SUBCHAPTER II. COMMON CARRIERS
PART I. COMMON CARRIER REGULATION
§ 230. PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE BLOCKING 
AND SCREENING OF OFFENSIVE MATERIAL
Effective: April 11, 2018
Currentness 
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other 
interactive computer services available to individual 
Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources 
to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control 
over the information that they receive, as well as the 
potential for even greater control in the future as 
technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of 
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
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development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, 
with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive 
media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, 
and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information is 
received by individuals, families, and schools who use 
the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that 
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empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal 
laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and 
screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content 
provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be held liable on account of--
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, 
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available 
to information content providers or others the 
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technical means to restrict access to material 
described in paragraph (1)1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at 
the time of entering an agreement with a customer for 
the provision of interactive computer service and in 
a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify 
such customer that parental control protections (such 
as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) 
are commercially available that may assist the customer 
in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. 
Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with 
access to information identifying, current providers of 
such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair 
the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, 
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other 
Federal criminal statute.
1. So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”.
47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 47 USCA § 230
Current through P.L. 116-21.
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(2) No effect on intellectual property law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent 
any State from enforcing any State law that is 
consistent with this section. No cause of action may 
be brought and no liability may be imposed under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such 
Act, or any similar State law.
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)
(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit--
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 
1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim 
constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought 
under State law if the conduct underlying the 
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charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 
of Title 18; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought 
under State law if the conduct underlying the 
charge would constitute a violation of section 
2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of 
prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the 
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution 
was targeted.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international 
computer network of both Federal and non-Federal 
interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term “interactive computer service” means 
any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions.
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(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.
(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider 
of software (including client or server software), or 
enabling tools that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, 
search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate 
content.
CREDIT(S)
(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Pub.L. 104-
104, Title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137; amended 
Pub.L. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), Oct. 21, 1998, 
112 Stat. 2681-739; Pub.L. 115-164, § 4(a), Apr. 11, 2018, 
132 Stat. 1254.)
